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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 A federal jury convicted appellant Theodore Edmonds of 
violating the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute ("CCE"), 21 
U.S.C. § 848, which makes it a crime to organize, supervise, or 
manage five or more persons in a "continuing series of 
violations" of the federal narcotics laws.  Edmonds argues that 
the district court erred in failing to instruct the jurors that, 
in order to convict, they must agree unanimously on which 
violations -- of the eight alleged -- constituted the three 
related violations necessary to establish a "continuing series." 
 In United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 
1988), we held that the CCE statute requires jury unanimity as to 
the identity of each of the three related violations comprising 
the continuing series.  This in banc1 rehearing gives us the 
opportunity to reconsider Echeverri.  The question of the degree 
of jury unanimity required by the CCE statute is a difficult one, 
and other courts of appeals have disagreed with Echeverri's 
                     
1
 This may be one of this court's last "in banc" opinions. Until 
recently, we have eschewed the more common "en banc" spelling in 
favor of the latin form.  However, a proposed amendment to the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure adopts the "en banc" 
spelling. See Fed R. App. P. 35 (Preliminary Draft of Proposed 
Amendment September 1995). 
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resolution, see, e.g., United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910, and cert. denied sub nom. 
Flynn v. United States, 503 U.S. 996 (1992).  Nevertheless, 
guided by historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence, 
constitutional considerations, and the rule of lenity, we 
reaffirm Echeverri and hold that the CCE statute requires juror 
unanimity as to the identity of the related violations comprising 
the continuing series. 
 In view of this holding, we must also decide whether 
the district court's failure to give the proper unanimity 
instruction was harmless error.  This task requires us to examine 
the scope of Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993), which 
held that an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction cannot be 
harmless because such error undermines an essential premise of 
harmless error analysis -- the existence of an actual verdict of 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 2082. 
 We conclude that Sullivan does not preclude harmless 
error analysis in this case.  Unlike the verdict in Sullivan, in 
which an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction undermined all of 
the jury's findings, the jury in this case delivered valid 
findings on essentially all of the elements of the offense by 
convicting Edmonds of every violation alleged to constitute the 
continuing series.  These convictions do not themselves show 
unanimous agreement that the same three violations were 
sufficiently related to each other to constitute a continuing 
series.  However, the evidence that the jury must have credited 
to find Edmonds guilty of the predicate violations unequivocally 
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established that all charged violations were related.  In such 
circumstances, no rational jury could unanimously find Edmonds 
guilty of the predicate offenses without unanimously finding that 
the offenses were related to each other.  We thus affirm 
Edmonds's conviction. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 The facts of this case are fully set out in the earlier 
panel opinion, see United States v. Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1241 
(3d Cir.), vacated in part, 52 F.3d 1251 (3d Cir. 1995); thus, we 
provide only a brief summary.  The evidence at trial showed that 
Edmonds led a nationwide cocaine and heroin distribution network. 
The organization was based in Los Angeles, California and sold 
drugs to distributors for resale in various locales, including 
Chester, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Wilmington, Delaware; 
Wilmington, North Carolina; Detroit, Michigan; New Orleans, 
Louisiana; and Toledo, Ohio. 
 A federal grand jury returned a twenty-seven count 
indictment against Edmonds and eleven other people.  The 
indictment charged Edmonds with conspiracy to distribute cocaine 
and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; distribution of 
heroin and aiding and abetting distribution in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §841(a)(1); two counts of distribution of cocaine and 
aiding and abetting distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§841(a)(1); three counts of unlawful use of a communications 
facility in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 243(b); and four counts of 
money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) & 
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(2).  In addition, the indictment charged Edmonds with engaging 
in a CCE in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.  The CCE count 
identified eight predicate offenses:  the conspiracy count, the 
three distribution counts, the three communications facility 
counts, and one of the money laundering counts.2 
 At trial, the district court gave the following 
instruction concerning the CCE charge: 
So the Government has to prove that he 
[Edmonds] committed a felony in violation of 
narcotics laws; i.e.[,] that in some way he 
was causing or attempting to cause the 
distribution of cocaine and heroin as charged 
in Count 1 of the indictment or in other 
counts charged in the indictment. 
 
 The Government has to prove secondly 
that such violation was part of a continuing 
series of related violations of the federal 
narcotics laws.  A continuing series of 
violations requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that three or more violations of the 
laws occurred and that they, those three or 
more, were related to each other. 
  
App. 577.  The court rejected Edmonds's request that it explain 
to the jurors that they must unanimously agree on which three 
related violations occurred.  Instead, the court gave only 
general unanimity instructions.  See, e.g., App. 581 ("You are 
asked to deliberate with a view towards reaching a unanimous 
decision with respect to each count and each defendant charged 
                     
2
 The indictment's inclusion of the money laundering offense, 18 
U.S.C. § 1956, as a CCE predicate offense appears to be in error.  
See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (defining CCE predicate offenses as 
violations of U.S. Code Title 21, Chapter 13, subchapter I or 
II). However, Edmonds has not raised this issue, and we thus deem 
it waived. 
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here in this indictment.").  The jury convicted Edmonds of all 
counts. 
 A panel of this Court reversed Edmonds's CCE 
conviction.  The panel's decision was based on United States v. 
Echeverri, which held that a district court's refusal to give a 
specific unanimity instruction in a CCE trial is reversible 
error.  See Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 643.  The panel found 
Echeverri controlling despite a significant difference between 
the two cases.  In Echeverri, the government had introduced 
evidence of a plethora of drug-related activity to establish the 
continuing series, and, because the jury did not hand down 
verdicts on the separate predicate offenses, it was unclear 
whether the jury agreed that the same three predicate violations 
occurred.  See id. at 642-43.  In contrast, Edmonds's jury 
convicted him of each of the narcotics violations alleged to 
constitute the continuing series, and hence it must have 
unanimously agreed that Edmonds committed every violation in the 
alleged series.  Nevertheless, the panel found Echeverri 
controlling because the jury may not have agreed on which three 
offenses were related to each other.  For example, six jurors may 
have felt that violations A,B, & C (but no others) were related, 
and the other six jurors may have concluded that violations D, E, 
& F (but no others) were related.  See Edmonds, 52 F.3d at 1241. 
 The panel then held that harmless error analysis was 
inapplicable.  Although the evidence that the jury must have 
believed to find Edmonds guilty of the predicate offenses also 
established a single ongoing scheme, the panel reasoned that 
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Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993), barred it from 
engaging in harmless error analysis.  Sullivan held that a 
constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction cannot be 
harmless because the error precludes the existence of a guilty 
verdict upon which harmless error scrutiny could operate.  Id. at 
2082.3  Analogizing lack of jury unanimity to an unconstitutional 
definition of reasonable doubt, the panel held that "there has 
been no actual jury finding of guilty on the CCE charge," and 
thus that it could not rule that the error was harmless. Edmonds, 
52 F.3d at 1244. 
 The government petitioned for rehearing, arguing that 
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), and United States v. 
Jackson, 879 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1989), have undermined Echeverri's 
specific unanimity holding; the government also attacked the 
panel's harmless error analysis.  We granted the petition and 
reheard the case in banc. 
 
II. The CCE Statute & Specific Juror Unanimity 
 To convict a defendant under the CCE statute, the 
government must prove:  (1) that the defendant committed a felony 
violation of a provision of United States Code Title 21, Chapter 
13, subchapter I or II (various drug offenses); (2) that this 
violation was part of a "continuing series" of violations of 
these subchapters; (3) that the defendant, in committing the 
                     
3
 In Sullivan, the trial judge gave a definition of reasonable 
doubt virtually identical to one held unconstitutional in Cage v. 
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 (1990) (per curiam). 
8 
continuing series of violations, acted as an organizer, 
supervisor, or manager of five or more other persons; and (4) 
that the defendant obtained "substantial income or resources" 
from such activities.4 
 Only the second requirement -- that the defendant 
committed a felony as part of a continuing series of violations -
- is at issue in this appeal.  We have held, as have most courts 
of appeals, that a "series" consists of at least three predicate 
violations.  See Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 643; see also, e.g., 
United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1570 (9th 
                     
4
 In relevant part, 21 U.S.C. § 848 states: 
 
[A] person is engaged in a continuing 
criminal enterprise if -- 
 
 (1) he violates any provision 
of this subchapter or subchapter II of 
this chapter the punishment for which is 
a felony, and 
 
 (2) such violation is part of 
a continuing series of violations of 
this subchapter or subchapter II of this 
chapter -- 
 
 (A) which are 
undertaken by such person in 
concert with five or more 
other persons with respect to 
whom such person occupies a 
position of organizer, a 
supervisory position, or any 
other position of management, 
and 
 
 (B) from which such 
person obtains substantial 
income or resources. 
 
21 U.S.C. § 848(c). 
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Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1003 (1990); United States v. 
Young, 745 F.2d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. 
Myers v. United States, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).  But see United 
States v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1100, 1102-05 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(requiring only two predicate offenses), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
876, and cert. denied sub nom. Manns v. United States, 498 U.S. 
904 (1990).  Furthermore, because the series must be 
"continuing," the three predicate offenses must be related to 
each other in some way.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 801 
F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir. 1986); Baker, 905 F.2d at 1104. 
 As we have explained, the critical question is whether 
the jury need unanimously agree only that the defendant committed 
three related violations or whether, instead, the jury must 
unanimously agree that the same three related violations 
occurred.  Although it is well settled that a defendant in a 
federal criminal trial has a constitutional right to a unanimous 
verdict, see, e.g., Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748-49 
(1948); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-90 (1930); see 
also Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a), the level of factual specificity on 
which the jury must be unanimous is far from clear.  In Schad v. 
Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), a plurality of the Supreme Court 
shed some light on this question.  Schad indicates that the scope 
of jury unanimity is primarily a question of legislative intent, 
although due process limits the legislature's definitional power. 
 Following Schad, we view the CCE unanimity question 
principally in terms of congressional intent.  We recognize that, 
on its face, the CCE statute gives little indication of 
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Congress's intent with respect to jury unanimity.  Nevertheless, 
guided by historical tradition, constitutional considerations, 
and the rule of lenity, we conclude that a statute combining 
formerly separate crimes -- crimes that may take place at 
different times and at different places -- should generally be 
read to require unanimity as to each predicate offense.  Here, 
because there is no indication of intent to the contrary, we hold 
that in order to convict a defendant under the CCE statute, the 
jury must unanimously agree that the same three related predicate 
offenses occurred. 
 
A. The Analytic Framework 
 In Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), a four-
Justice plurality concluded that when a statute enumerates 
alternative routes for its violation, whether jurors must be 
unanimous with respect to a particular route depends on two 
questions.  First, did the legislature intend the different 
routes to establish separate "offenses," for which unanimity is 
required as to every fact constituting the offense, or different 
"means" of violating a single offense, for which unanimity is not 
required?  Second, if the legislature intended the alternative 
routes to be mere means of violating a single statute, is the 
statute's definition of the crime unconstitutional under the Due 
Process Clause? 
 Edward Harold Schad was convicted under an Arizona 
statute that defined first degree murder as "murder which is . . 
. wilful, deliberate or premeditated . . . or which is committed 
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. . . in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, . . . 
robbery."  Id. at 628 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-452 (supp. 
1973)).  At trial, the prosecutor advanced theories of both 
premeditated murder and felony murder, and the trial court gave 
only a general unanimity instruction (i.e., that all jurors must 
agree on whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty).  On 
appeal, Schad argued that the state trial court had erred in not 
requiring the jury to agree on a single theory of first degree 
murder.  The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Schad's conviction, 
stating, "In Arizona, first degree murder is only one crime 
regardless whether it occurs as a premeditated murder or a felony 
murder. . . .  [T]he defendant is not entitled to a unanimous 
verdict on the manner in which the act was committed."  Id. at 
629 (plurality opinion) (quoting State v. Schad, 788 P.2d 1162, 
1168 (Ariz. 1989)). 
 A divided United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
Arizona Supreme Court's judgment.  In an opinion joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, Justice 
Souter analyzed the problem in terms of due process limits on the 
legislature's power to define criminal conduct, and not as a jury 
unanimity issue.  Id. at 630-31 (plurality opinion).5  Because 
the Arizona Supreme Court, the final interpreter of Arizona law, 
had held that felony murder and premeditation were merely 
different "means" of committing a single "offense," the intent of 
                     
5
 Justice Scalia joined part of Justice Souter's opinion, not 
relevant to this case, dealing with the right to have the jury 
instructed on a lesser included offense in capital cases. 
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the Arizona legislature had been conclusively established, and 
Schad's jury was unanimous on all the facts necessary to 
establish the offense.  See Schad, 501 U.S. at 630-31.  Thus, it 
was unnecessary to decide whether a criminal defendant has a 
right to a unanimous verdict in a state capital case.6 
 The remaining issue was whether Arizona's definition of 
the crime is constitutional under the Due Process Clause.  The 
plurality concluded -- and Justice Scalia seemed to agree -- that 
due process limits the legislature's "capacity to define 
different courses of conduct . . . as merely alternative means of 
committing a single offense, thereby permitting a defendant's 
conviction without jury agreement as to which course . . . 
actually occurred."  Id. at 632 (plurality opinion); see also id. 
at 650-52 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing 
due process limitation). 
 The plurality described this due process concern as 
analogous to vagueness: 
The axiomatic requirement of due process that 
a statute may not forbid conduct in terms so 
vague that people of common intelligence 
would be relegated to different guesses about 
its meaning carries the practical consequence 
that a defendant charged under a valid 
statute will be in a position to understand 
with some specificity the legal basis of the 
charge against him.  Thus it is an assumption 
of our system of criminal justice "'so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our 
                     
6
 Although the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict in 
federal criminal trials, it does not so require in state trials. 
See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 
406 U.S. 404 (1972).  In Schad, Schad argued that the Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments require a unanimous jury in 
state capital cases.  As mentioned, the Court did not reach this 
question. 
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people as to be ranked as fundamental,'" that 
no person may be punished criminally save 
upon proof of some specific illegal conduct. 
Just as the requisite specificity of the 
charge may not be compromised by the joining 
of separate offenses, nothing in our history 
suggests that the Due Process Clause would 
permit a State to convict anyone under a 
charge of "Crime" so generic that any 
combination of jury findings of embezzlement, 
reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax 
evasion, or littering, would suffice for 
conviction. 
Id. at 632-33 (plurality opinion) (citations and footnote 
omitted). 
 The plurality's due process test looked to "history and 
wide practice as guides to fundamental values, as well as to 
narrower analytic methods of testing the moral and practical 
equivalence" of alternative means of satisfying an element of an 
offense.  Id. at 637.  Finding ample historical evidence that 
murder has been defined as killing another with "malice 
aforethought" (of which the intent to kill and the intent to 
commit a felony were alternative aspects), that a significant 
number of other states defined murder in the same way that 
Arizona did, and that a moral equivalence between the two means 
could be found on the facts of the case, Justice Souter concluded 
that the Arizona statute was constitutional. 
 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia agreed that 
the statute at issue was constitutional under the Due Process 
Clause, but disagreed as to the appropriate constitutional test. 
He argued that due process is defined solely in terms of 
historical practice, at least when the procedure at issue has 
historical roots.  See id. at 650 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
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judgment).  Because of the ample historical evidence cited by the 
plurality, Justice Scalia agreed with its judgment.  Id. at 651. 
 Justice White dissented in an opinion joined by 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.  Grounding his analysis 
in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), which requires "proof 
beyond a reasonable of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime," Justice White opined that the verdict at issue provided 
"no clues whether the jury agrees that the three elements of 
premeditated murder or the two elements of felony murder have 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Schad, 501 U.S. at 655 
(White, J., dissenting). 
 
B. The Analysis Applied to the CCE Statute 
 Unlike the Supreme Court in Schad, which was bound by the 
Arizona Supreme Court's interpretation of state law, we must 
interpret the CCE statute.  In relevant part, 21 U.S.C. § 848 
provides: 
 
[A] person is engaged in a continuing criminal 
enterprise if -- 
 
 (1) he violates any provision of this 
subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter the 
punishment for which is a felony, and 
 
 (2) such violation is part of a continuing 
series of violations of this subchapter or 
subchapter II of this chapter -- 
 
21 U.S.C. § 848(c).  In the language of Schad, the question is 
whether the menu of predicate violations specified by subchapters 
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I and II are different "means" or different "offenses."7  In 
other words, do the provisions represent various ways to commit 
the CCE crime, like shooting, drowning, etc. for a murder 
statute?  Or do they represent different crimes themselves, such 
that the jury must agree which particular related violations were 
committed?8  
                     
7
 Our inquiry is not, as Judge Alito suggests, whether Congress 
intended to include "a special jury-unanimity requirement." 
Rather, we must determine, as we do with all statutes, what level 
of unanimity Congress intended.  In Schad's terms, the question 
is whether Congress intended a given fact to be an "element."  
When a legislature enacts a statute, the legislature determines 
that certain facts are "elements," i.e., that they are 
"indispensable to proof of a given offense."  Schad, 501 U.S. at 
633 (plurality opinion).  The characterization of a fact as an 
"element" then carries the consequence that the jury must agree 
that the fact occurred in order to convict.  See, e.g., id. at 
639 ("The essence of petitioner's argument is that, despite [the 
Arizona Supreme Court's] unitary definition of the offense, each 
of these means must be treated as an independent element as to 
which the jury must agree . . . ."). 
 
 When the object of our statutory interpretation inquiry is 
correctly identified, Judge Alito's criticisms fall short.  That 
Congress has not generally adopted "special unanimity 
requirements" or that Congress can be explicit when it wants 
"special unanimity requirements" is immaterial.  Congress 
determines "elements," and hence, what facts require unanimous 
jury agreement, every time it passes a criminal statute.  For 
example, we would not allow a conviction to stand for murder 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 without unanimous agreement that someone 
was killed.  Congress has made the unlawful killing of a human 
being an "element" for which unanimity is required.  (Of course, 
the present inquiry is more difficult than this example, because 
we must inquire whether the CCE statute creates more than one 
offense, see infra note 8, each with its own elements). 
8
 The Schad plurality recognized that a single statute offering 
alternative routes of violation may create multiple offenses for 
which unanimity is required.  For example, in rejecting the 
dissent's mode of analysis, the plurality stated: 
 
In the dissent's view, whenever a statute lists 
alternative means of committing a crime, "the jury 
[must] indicate on which of the alternatives it has 
based the defendant's guilt," even where there is no 
16 
 The statute lends itself to either interpretation.  On the 
one hand, the statute is triggered by violation of "any 
provision" as part of a "continuing series of violations."  By 
placing no emphasis on the particular, the statute could be read 
to say that different routes of violation are fungible 
alternatives, suggesting that the provisions are mere "means." 
 On the other hand, the different ways of violating the CCE 
statute are themselves separate offenses defined in the United 
States Code.  The predicate violations are things which, by 
definition, Congress views as separate offenses.  Cf. Babb v. 
United States, 218 F.2d 538, 539-40 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1955) ("The 
statute under which this prosecution is lodged [18 U.S.C. § 545] 
defines two separate types of offenses [because] [t]he first 
                                                                  
indication that the statute seeks to create separate 
crimes.  This approach rests on the erroneous 
assumption that any statutory alternatives are ipso 
facto independent elements defining independent crimes 
under state law, and therefore subject to the axiomatic 
principle that the prosecution must prove independently 
every element of the crime.  In point of fact, . . . 
legislatures frequently enumerate alternative means of 
committing a crime without intending to define separate 
elements or separate crimes. The question whether 
statutory alternatives constitute independent elements 
of the offense therefore does not, as the dissent would 
have it, call for a mere tautology; rather it is a 
substantial question of statutory construction.  
 
Schad 501 U.S. at 635-36 (plurality opinion) (footnotes and 
citations omitted).  The plurality's statement that "legislatures 
frequently enumerate alternative means of committing a crime 
without intending to define separate elements or separate crimes" 
implies that the plurality believes legislatures sometimes do 
intend to define separate crimes when they enumerate alternative 




paragraph . . . was derived from 19 U.S.C. §1593(a), which in 
turn had as its source R.S. § 2865 . . . . [and] [t]he second 
paragraph . . . was derived from 19 U.S.C. §1593(b), which in 
turn had as its source R.S. § 3082.").  Thus, we find the 
language of the statute inconclusive.9 
 Legislative history also provides little help here.  Neither 
party cited any legislative history, and our own research failed 
to turn up any probative evidence.  Indeed, the opaqueness of the 
"continuing series" requirement was a matter of concern to some 
members of Congress.  See H.R. Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4651 (stating 
"additional views" of some committee members that "it is not at 
all clear what constitutes a 'continuing series of violations'"). 
 At least one circuit -- the Seventh -- has argued that the 
purpose of the CCE statute sheds light on Congress's intent. 
The point of the CCE statute is to impose special 
punishment on those who organize and direct a 
                     
9
 If the correct statutory analysis is used (i.e., whether 
Congress intended the different alternatives of violating the CCE 
statute to constitute separate "offenses"), Judge Alito's 
argument that the CCE statute is unambiguous is not tenable.  The 
alternatives at issue here -- "violat[ions of] any provision of 
this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter" -- are 
themselves defined as separate crimes.  It is far from clear 
whether Congress intended these alternatives to lose their status 
as separate offenses when then they were incorporated by 
reference into a new statute. 
 
 Judge Alito's dispute with our statutory analysis is really 
a dispute over the appropriate default rule for interpreting 
congressional silence.  He criticizes us for failing to anchor 
our analysis in the text or legislative history of the CCE 
statute, but he cites no text or legislative history in support 
of his view that CCE predicate offenses are not "elements" for 
which unanimity is required.  The reason for both our omissions 
is sound; the statute is simply silent on this issue. 
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significant number of larger scale drug transactions; 
the exact specification by unanimous jury consent of 
any particular three . . . offenses is irrelevant to 
any theory about why punishment should be enhanced for 
such uniquely antisocial activity. 
 
United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 948 (7th Cir. 1991).  We 
think this argument proves too much:  the punitive purpose of a 
criminal statute will never be served by providing more 
procedural protections to the defendant.  Furthermore, even a 
more nuanced inquiry into a statute's purpose is unlikely to 
provide insight.  A statute's broad goal says little about 
whether different acts falling within the statute are means or 
offenses, or about the requisite degree of jury agreement. 
 Although we are skeptical that the first prong of the Schad 
analysis -- examining whether the legislature, in enumerating 
alternatives, intended to create a single or multiple offenses --
has much predictive force, we must perforce attempt to work with 
Schad.10  In doing so, we acknowledge that the CCE statute offers 
little explicit guidance on Congress's intent.  We therefore turn 
to several background interpretive principles, which, we 
conclude, establish that Congress did intend to require jury 
unanimity as to the CCE predicate offenses.11   
 
                     
10
 Arguably, rather than looking to the legislature's intent, it 
would be preferable to ask, in the first instance, whether 
differences between statutory alternatives are so important that 
the lack of jury agreement as to a specific alternative casts too 
much doubt on the accuracy of the verdict.  See Scott W. Howe, 
Jury Fact-Finding in Criminal Cases, 58 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1993). 
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will revisit this question soon. 
11
 We use the phrase "jury unanimity as to the CCE predicate 
offenses" to mean jury agreement on both the identity and 
relatedness of the three offenses. 
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1. Background Interpretive Principles 
a. Tradition in Criminal Jurisprudence 
 We look first to general historical tradition in criminal 
jurisprudence.  Criminal trials have long ensured substantial 
jury agreement as to the facts establishing the offense.  This is 
because criminal statutes and the common law have generally 
defined crimes in terms of conduct (and accompanying mental 
state) that takes place in a single place at some specific time. 
For example, murder statutes require that the defendant killed 
some other person, an act occurring in some specified time and 
place.  Thus, when a jury delivers a general guilty verdict for 
such a crime, we are confident that the jury agreed on most of 
the actions engaged in by the defendant.  When there is a real 
risk that a jury will convict without agreement on a discrete set 
of actions, courts have required specific unanimity instructions. 
See, e.g., United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 928-29 (5th 
Cir. 1991) (reversing a conviction for perjury because the 
district court's instructions allowed the jury to convict without 
agreement as to a particular false statement), cert. denied, 114 
S. Ct. 77 (1993).  In our view, substantial agreement on a 
discrete set of actions is essential to ensure that the defendant 
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of some specific illegal 
conduct.  See Howe, supra n.10. 
 In the face of this tradition, we cannot read from 
Congress's silence that it intended CCE predicate offenses to 
constitute mere means of violating a single CCE offense.  To do 
so would allow conviction on jury agreement merely that the 
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defendant committed some three violations of United States Code 
Title 21, Chapter 13, subchapters I and II, even when it is 
alleged that the defendant committed many different acts 
occurring at different times and places.  This is a wholly 
different situation from the one at issue in Schad.  Indeed, as 
Justice Scalia pointed out in criticizing the plurality's moral 
equivalence test of constitutionality, "We would not permit, for 
example, an indictment charging that the defendant assaulted 
either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday, despite the 'moral 
equivalence' of those two acts."  Schad, 501 U.S. at 651 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment).12  
 
b. Constitutional Considerations 
 Constitutional considerations also guide our analysis. There 
is a real possibility that the CCE statute would violate the Due 
Process Clause absent a specific unanimity requirement. See Eric 
S. Miller, Note, Compound-Complex Criminal Statutes and the 
Constitution:  Demanding Unanimity as to Predicate Acts, 104 Yale 
L.J. 2277 (1995).  "[W]here a statute is susceptible to two 
                     
12
 Judge Alito challenges our reading of history, arguing that it 
is not true (1) that the jury has always been required to 
"agree[] on most of the actions engaged in by the defendant"; nor 
(2) that the prosecution has always been required to establish 
the "specified time and place" where a charged offense occurred.  
But this response, which artificially atomizes our position, is 
fundamentally flawed.  Although each of Judge Alito's 
propositions is correct in isolation, the question is whether 
convictions have been allowed to stand where the jury disagrees 
on both (1) most of the defendant's actions; and (2) the time and 
place the crime occurred.  If the CCE predicate offenses are not 
elements upon which the jury must agree, that is what the CCE 
statute would allow. 
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constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional 
questions arise and by the other of which such questions are 
avoided, [our] duty is to adopt the latter."  United States ex 
rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 
(1909).   
 Both the Schad plurality and Justice Scalia agree that due 
process is defined in part by historical practice.  As mentioned, 
interpreting predicate offenses as different means of violating a 
single continuing series element marks a departure from 
historical guarantees on the degree of factual agreement 
necessary to establish a conviction.  And, of course, on a more 
specific level, there is no historical analogue to the CCE 
statute.  The first complex criminal statutes like the CCE law 
appeared only in 1970.  See Miller, supra, at 2280 & nn. 12-14.13 
We recognize that "history [is] less useful as a yardstick in 
                     
13
 Judge Garth asserts that the law of conspiracy provides a 
historical analogue to the continuing series requirement, 
because, he argues, a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy 
without jury agreement as to which object, of various objects 
alleged, forms the basis of the conspiracy.  We disagree.  First, 
we are skeptical of Judge Garth's premise.  At some point, 
different alleged conspiracy objects suggest such disparate fact 
patterns that jury agreement as to the precise object of the 
conspiracy is necessary to support conviction.  See United States 
v. Castro, 887 F.2d 988, 993 (9th Cir. 1989) ("A unanimity 
instruction as to the particular objects of a charged conspiracy 
is appropriate where it appears that a conviction might rest upon 
different jurors having found the existence of different facts . 
. . ."); accord United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 653 (9th 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1030 (1989).  Second, even 
assuming Judge Garth's view of conspiracy law is correct, the 
object of a conspiracy -- the purpose of the conspiratorial 
agreement -- is hardly analogous to the continuing series 
requirement, which requires three completed acts (with 
accompanying mental states) that themselves constitute separate 
crimes.   
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cases dealing with modern statutory offenses lacking clear common 
law roots."  Schad, 501 U.S. at 640 n.7 (plurality opinion).  But 
to the extent history has any force, it counsels against 
interpreting CCE predicate violations as means, for which 
unanimity is not required. 
 Moreover, in addition to historical practice, the Schad 
plurality believed that due process requires that different 
means, for which unanimity is not required, must reflect notions 
of "equivalent blameworthiness or culpability."  Schad, 501 U.S. 
at 643 (plurality opinion).  If the predicate offenses are 
interpreted as means, we suspect that the CCE statute may have 
serious problems meeting this requirement.  A violation of any 
provision of U.S. Code Title 21, Chapter 13, subchapter I or II 
can serve as a predicate offense.  See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c). 
Predicate offenses thus range from simple possession of 
marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 844, to the distribution of cocaine or 
heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 841.  The disparate penalties imposed for 
different violations -- generally no more than a year in prison 
for the first-time offense of simple possession, see 21 U.S.C. 
§844(a), compared to a minimum of ten years in jail for 
distributing a large quantity of drugs, see 21 U.S.C. 
§841(b)(1)(A) -- cast serious doubt on whether different 
predicate offenses (at least these different offenses) can be 
characterized as equally blameworthy.14  These potential 
                     
14
 The predicate offenses involved in this case do not pose the 
severe disparate culpability problem identified in the 
hypothetical above, and thus Edmonds is not in a position to 
challenge the CCE statute's constitutionality on this basis.  See 
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constitutional problems -- both equivalent blameworthiness and 
lack of a historical analogue -- also lead us to interpret the 
CCE predicate violations as elements of different offenses, for 
which unanimity is required.   
 Judge Garth criticizes this analysis, because, in his view, 
Congress has "already determined" that different predicate 
offenses are equally blameworthy by making them alternative 
routes of violating the same statute.  But this view 
fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the "equivalent 
blameworthiness" analysis.  The Schad plurality's test is a check 
on the legislature's power:  its purpose is to decide whether 
different routes of violating the same statute are so morally 
disparate that a legislature cannot constitutionally treat them 
as mere means.  Thus, the mere fact that Congress has established 
alternative routes of violating the same statute shows only the 
need for the equivalent blameworthiness analysis; it cannot 
answer the question. 
 Judge Garth also suggests that the equivalent 
blameworthiness test is a pointless exercise:  even if different 
predicate offenses are so morally disparate that a specific 
unanimity instruction is required, he argues, a defendant could 
still be convicted under the CCE statute for widely different 
offenses.  While this argument points out another potential 
                                                                  
Schad, 501 U.S. at 644 ("The question is whether felony murder 
may ever be treated as the equivalent of murder by deliberation, 
and in particular whether robbery murder as charged in this case 
may be treated as thus equivalent.") (emphasis added).  However, 
the possibility of constitutional problems in other cases is an 
important consideration in our interpretive inquiry. 
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problem with the CCE statute -- one not at issue on this appeal -
- it does not undermine the utility of the equivalent 
blameworthiness test. 
  
c. The Rule of Lenity 
 Finally, requiring specific unanimity is counseled by 
concerns underlying the rule of lenity.  That rule -- requiring 
ambiguous criminal statutes to be construed in favor of the 
defendant -- is applied both to the scope of conduct covered by a 
criminal statute and to the extent of the penalties imposed. See, 
e.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980) ("In 
past cases the Court has made it clear that [the rule of lenity] 
applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of 
criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.") 
(citations omitted).  According to the Supreme Court, the rule 
ensures "there is fair warning of the boundaries of criminal 
conduct and that legislatures, not courts, define criminal 
liability."  Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) 
(citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985); 
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971)). 
 The rule of lenity is not directly applicable to the 
question whether a single statute creates multiple offenses for 
purposes of jury unanimity.  However, the rule has been applied 
to a conceptually analogous situation:  whether a single criminal 
act constitutes one or more violations of a statute.  See Ladner 
v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958) (a single discharge of a 
shotgun wounding two federal officers constitutes a single 
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 254 (1940)); Bell v. United States, 349 
U.S. 81 (1955) (transporting two women across states lines 
constitutes a single violation of the Mann Act); United States v. 
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952) (each breach 
of Fair Labor Standards Act duty to a single employee in any 
single workweek does not constitute a separate offense). 
 Moreover, the principles motivating the rule have 
considerable force here.  Several cases -- those addressing the 
penalties a defendant will receive -- suggest that people deserve 
warning not only of the boundaries of criminal conduct, but also 
of the repercussions of crossing those boundaries.  For example, 
in United States v. Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259, 1261 (1994), the 
Court addressed the meaning of "the original sentence" in a 
statute providing that if a person serving a sentence of 
probation possesses illegal drugs, "the court shall revoke the 
sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than 
one-third of the original sentence."  114 S. Ct. 1259, 1261 
(1994) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)) (emphasis added).  Because 
the phrase was ambiguous, the Court applied the rule of lenity 
and interpreted the phrase to mean the applicable Guidelines 
sentence of imprisonment, not the revoked term of probation, 
resulting in a much shorter sentence.  Id. at 1267-68.  In that 
case, the defendant's conduct -- possessing illegal drugs while 
on probation -- was clearly illegal and the only question was the 
harshness of the penalty.  The court's opinion thus implies that 
fair warning as to the harshness of criminal penalties is an 
important concern.  Accord Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 
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381, 400 (1980) (applying rule of lenity in deciding what 
punishment is authorized by a statute);  Ladner v. United States, 
358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958) ("This policy of lenity means that the 
Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to 
increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an 
interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what 
Congress intended."). 
 Procedural protections at trial are inherently linked to 
such repercussions, for these protections affect the likelihood 
that a penalty will be imposed.  At some point, differences in 
procedural protections become as significant as different 
penalties, and the need for fair warning just as critical.  The 
degree of jury unanimity required by a statute is important 
enough a protection that we hesitate to interpret an ambiguous 
statute to require less, rather than more, unanimity. 
 Just as in the rule of lenity cases, we are faced with an 
ambiguous statute.  See Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 
2059 (1993) (rule of lenity "is reserved for cases where, [a]fter 
seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be derived, the Court is 
left with an ambiguous statute.") (quoting United States v. Bass, 
404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 
(2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805))) (internal quotations omitted).  As 
mentioned, the language and legislative history of the CCE 
statute provide no clue as to Congress's view of specific 
unanimity.  In such a situation, principles underlying the rule 
of lenity, in conjunction with the other principles we have 
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discussed, lead us to read the CCE statute to require unanimity 
as to each predicate offense. 
 
2. Reconciling United States v. Jackson 
 The government argues that requiring specific unanimity as 
to predicate offenses would conflict with United States v. 
Jackson, 879 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1989), which held that, in a CCE 
prosecution, unanimous agreement is not required as to the 
identity of the five or more underlings supervised, organized, or 
managed by the defendant.  See also United States v. Canino, 949 
F.2d 928, 946 (7th Cir. 1992) (criticizing the apparent 
inconsistency between Jackson and Echeverri).  However, a proper 
understanding of congressional intent shows that Echeverri and 
Jackson are quite consistent. 
 In Jackson, we considered whether, in a CCE prosecution, 
unanimous agreement is required as to the identity of the five or 
more underlings supervised, organized, or managed by the 
defendant.  We concluded that the primary concern of the five or 
more persons requirement is "that the organization in which the 
defendant played a leadership role was sufficiently large to 
warrant . . . enhanced punishment," and held that unanimity on 
the specific identity of the underlings is not required.  Id. at 
88. 
 Jackson's holding is consistent with our holding here for 
two reasons.  First, unlike the continuing series requirement, 
the five-person requirement has a historical analogue in the law 
of conspiracy, which generally has not required the jury to 
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unanimously agree on the identity of the defendant's co-
conspirators.  See United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 256 & 
n.13 (D.C. Cir.) (stating this proposition and citing cases), 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 932, and cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 932, and cert. denied sub nom. Palmer v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 933 (1992).15  Second, unlike the wide 
array of potential CCE predicate offenses, acting in concert with 
one group of five people is no more or less blameworthy than 
acting in concert with another group of five.  Id. at 256-57. 
Thus, two of three reasons that lead us to conclude from its 
silence that Congress meant to require unanimity as to specific 
predicate offenses -- historical precedent and possible 
constitutional problems -- cause us to read congressional silence 
as to the five-person requirement quite differently. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 In summary, we hold that the CCE statute requires unanimous 
agreement as to the identity of each of the three related 
offenses comprising the continuing series.  Our interpretation is 
guided by constitutional concerns, traditions in criminal 
jurisprudence, and the rule of lenity.  These background 
principles lead us to conclude that when a statute combines 
                     
15
 The CCE statute's requirement that the defendant act "in 
concert" with five or more other people, 21 U.S.C. § 848(c), is 
similar to conspiracy law's requirement that a defendant enter 
into an agreement with some number of co-conspirators.  Thus, the 
identity of a conspiracy defendant's co-conspirators provides a 
useful historical analogue to the identity of the five CCE 
underlings. 
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formerly distinct offenses into a single crime -- offenses that 
may occur at different times and in different places -- we should 
assume that Congress intended the formerly distinct offenses to 
retain their "offense" status with its attendant unanimity 
requirements.  Asking Congress to speak clearly is especially 
important here, where the penalty for violation of the statute is 
quite severe, from between twenty years to life in jail.  See 21 
U.S.C. § 848(a).  Because there is no evidence of congressional 
intent to the contrary, we hold that the CCE statute requires 
unanimity as to its predicate offenses. 
 In making this decision, we do not hamper Congress's ability 
to enact innovative statutes to deal with new kinds of crime. 
Congress may alter unanimity requirements by statute if it makes 
its intention clear.16  Furthermore, as this case illustrates, see 
infra, unanimity as to predicate offenses is hardly an onerous 
burden. 
III. Harmless Error 
 Because there is a "reasonable likelihood," Estelle v. 
McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 (1991); Boyde v. California, 494 
U.S. 370, 380 (1990), that the jury interpreted the district 
court's general unanimity instruction to require agreement only 
that some three predicate violations occurred and not that the 
same violations occurred, the district court's failure to give 
Edmonds's proposed specific unanimity instruction was error. This 
                     
16
 As our holding is based on statutory interpretation, we do not 
reach the question whether the CCE statute would be 
unconstitutional absent a unanimity requirement.  We leave that 
decision for another day. 
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error implicates Edmonds's Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous 
verdict in a federal criminal trial.17  However, most 
                     
17
 Language in the Schad plurality opinion arguably casts some 
doubt on whether the Sixth Amendment is implicated in jury 
verdict specificity problems.  See Schad, 501 U.S. at 634 n.5 
(plurality opinion) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit for grounding 
the right to jury consensus on a single course of action on the 
Sixth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause).  However, 
read as a whole, we think that the Schad plurality's emphasis on 
the Due Process Clause does not mean that the Sixth Amendment is 
irrelevant here.  Rather, we conclude that the Sixth Amendment 
does require unanimity, in federal criminal trials, on all 
elements of the offense.  However, because what constitutes an 
"element" is purely a matter of legislative intent, the Sixth 
Amendment places no limit on the legislature's power to make 
alternative facts "means" not subject to a unanimity requirement.  
The limit on the legislature's definitional power, then, comes 
from the Due Process Clause.  See Miller, supra, at 2284. 
  
 We will not engage Judge Alito's alternative view that only 
the Sixth Amendment is relevant here.  As the Schad plurality 
pointed out, "this difference in characterization . . . is 
immaterial to the problem of how to go about deciding what level 
of verdict specificity is constitutionally necessary."  Schad, 
501 U.S. at 634 n.5 (plurality opinion).  
 
 However, we reject the applicability of Judge Alito's 
constitutional test.  Judge Alito asserts that a legislative 
definition is unconstitutional only if it "contain[s] a 
combination of elements having no rational basis other than" an 
attempt to create room for factual disagreement underlying a 
conviction. While this framing of the issue represents an 
interesting way of balancing legislative deference with 
constitutional concerns, it is without support.  Judge Alito 
asserts that the problematic hypotheticals discussed in Schad -- 
(1) a crime permitting alternative findings of "embezzlement, 
reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering," 
Schad, 501 U.S. at 633 (plurality opinion); and (2) "a felony 
consisting of either robbery or failure to file a tax return," 
id. at 650 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) -- have no 
rational basis other than "the circumvention of otherwise 
applicable jury-unanimity requirements."  Although this may be a 
true descriptive claim, it does not justify displacing the 
constitutional tests explicitly stated by the Schad plurality 
(history, wide practice, and moral equivalence) and Justice 
Scalia (history) with a novel "rational combination of elements" 
test. 
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constitutional errors are subject to the harmless error analysis 
of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  See Rose v. Clark, 
478 U.S. 570, 578-79 (1986) ("[W]hile there are some errors to 
which Chapman does not apply, they are the exception and not the 
rule."). 
 Edmonds argues, and the original panel held, that Sullivan 
v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993), precludes us from engaging 
in harmless error analysis.  In Sullivan, a unanimous Supreme 
Court held that a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt 
instruction is not subject to harmless error analysis.  The Court 
reasoned that a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is a 
necessary predicate of Chapman's harmless error inquiry: 
[Chapman's] inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in 
a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty 
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether 
the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was 
surely unattributable to the error.  That must be so, 
because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never 
in fact rendered -- no matter how inescapable the 
findings to support that verdict might be -- would 
violate the jury-trial guarantee. 
 
 . . . .  There being no jury verdict of guilty-
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the 
same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would 
have been rendered absent the constitutional error is 
utterly meaningless.  There is no object, so to speak, 
upon which harmless error scrutiny can operate.  The 
most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury 
would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt -- not that the jury's actual finding 
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not 
have been different absent the constitutional error. 
That is not enough.  The Sixth Amendment requires more 
than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's 
action, or else directed verdicts for the State would 
be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury 
finding of guilty. 
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113 S. Ct. at 2081-82 (citations omitted).18  Edmonds asserts, and 
the panel agreed, that the jury instruction in this case allowed 
the jury to return a non-unanimous verdict on an element of the 
offense, and thus there is no actual jury finding of guilty upon 
which harmless error analysis may operate. 
 Edmonds and the panel are correct in a sense.  Just as the 
Sixth Amendment precludes the court from affirming on the ground 
that the jury would have found the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt had it been properly instructed, we cannot 
affirm a non-unanimous verdict simply because the evidence is so 
overwhelming that the jury surely would have been unanimous had 
it been properly instructed on unanimity. 
 Affirmance here, however, does not require making this 
speculative leap.  Unlike the complete undermining of the verdict 
that occurred in Sullivan, this case involves error affecting 
only one of many findings made by the jury.  The Supreme Court 
has held that similar errors -- jury instructions that 
erroneously contain a mandatory presumption or misdescribe an 
element of the offense -- may be harmless if the remaining 
unaffected jury findings are "functionally equivalent to finding" 
the lacking element.  Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 271 
                     
18
 In addition, the Court stated that "[a]nother mode of analysis 
leads to the same conclusion," and held that the unconstitutional 
reasonable doubt instruction was a "structural defect[] in the 
constitution of the trial mechanism" not subject to harmless 
error analysis.  Id. at 2082-83 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 
49 U.S. 279 (1991) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court)) 
(internal quotations omitted); see also Sullivan, 112 S. Ct. at 
2083-84 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (applying the Fulminante 
analysis). 
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(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)); see also Yates v. 
Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991) (instruction containing an erroneous 
presumption); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (same); 
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (same); Pope v. Illinois, 481 
U.S. 497 (1987) (instruction misstating an element of the 
offense). 
 Even though such errors impermissibly deprive the jury of 
its fact-finding function,19 the resulting verdicts may be 
salvageable.  Specifically, if other facts found by the jury are 
"so closely related" to the fact tainted by erroneous 
instructions "that no rational jury could find those facts 
without also finding [the former] fact, making those findings is 
functionally equivalent to finding" the lacking element. Carella, 
491 U.S. at 271 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see 
also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1986) ("When a jury  is 
instructed to presume malice from predicate facts, it still must 
find the existence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt.  In 
many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so 
that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the 
relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury.  In 
that event . . . [,] the jury has found, in Winship's words, 
                     
19
 See Carella, 491 U.S. at 265 ("Such directions subvert the 
presumption of innocence accorded to accused persons and also 
invade the truth-finding task assigned to juries in criminal 
cases."); id at 268 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
("The Court has disapproved the use of mandatory conclusive 
presumptions not merely because it conflict[s] with the 
overriding presumption of innocence . . ., but also because it 
invade[s] [the] fact-finding function which in a criminal case 
the law assigns solely to the jury.") (citations and internal 
quotations omitted) (alterations in original). 
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'every fact necessary' to establish every element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.") (citations omitted); Carella, 491 
U.S. at 266 (quoting this passage from Rose with approval); Pope, 
481 U.S. at 503 (same). 
 Sullivan itself distinguishes this line of cases from the 
fundamental flaw of misdescribing the burden of proof.  In the 
latter case, the error "vitiates all the jury's findings." 
Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2082 (emphasis in original).  Absent "the 
essential connection to a 'beyond-a-reasonable-doubt' factual 
finding . . . a reviewing court can only engage in pure 
speculation."  Id. at 2082 (citations omitted). 
 In this case it is unnecessary to speculate on what the 
jury's verdict would have been absent the erroneous instruction: 
the jury made proper unanimous findings of other facts which are 
"functionally equivalent" to finding that three specific 
predicate offenses were related to each other.  Adhering to the 
assumption that jurors follow the instructions they are given, 
see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987), we know that 
the jury unanimously found that Edmonds committed every CCE 
predicate offense alleged, and that Edmonds committed some three 
related predicate offenses. 
 The only finding for which unanimity is potentially lacking 
is that the same three predicate offenses are related to each 
other.  However, the evidence introduced at trial to show that 
Edmonds committed each of the predicate offenses established that 
Edmonds used the same packers and mode of distribution 
throughout.  See Edmonds, 52 F.3d at 1243.  Edmonds did not argue 
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to the jury -- and has not argued since -- that any of the 
predicate offenses were unrelated to the others.20  Thus, the 
facts necessarily found by the jury to convict on the predicate 
offenses show conclusively that all of the predicate offenses are 
related to each other. 
 In these circumstances, no rational jury could unanimously 
find Edmonds guilty of the predicate offenses without unanimously 
finding that the offenses were related to each other.  See 
Ianniello v. United States, 10 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a failure to instruct the jury that a RICO 
conviction requires a relationship between predicate offenses was 
harmless because the evidence which the jury must have believed 
to convict on every alleged predicate act conclusively 
established their relatedness); United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 
645, 658 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding harmless court's erroneously 
instructing the jury that it could convict for obstruction of 
justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 without finding that an official 
proceeding was pending because the jury's finding that the 
defendant attempted to obstruct justice "is so closely related to 
the ultimate and unrebutted fact of the existence of a pending 
grand jury proceeding"); United States v. Parmelee, 42 F.3d 387, 
393 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a failure to instruct the jury 
                     
20
 Edmonds suggests in his answer to the government's petition for 
rehearing that it would have been improper to dispute relatedness 
in the absence of his requested specific unanimity instruction.  
We reject this argument because the jury was properly instructed 
that it must find three related offenses to convict under the CCE 
statute.  Edmonds thus had ample incentive to contest 
relatedness. 
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on an essential element of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B) was harmless 
because unrebutted evidence meant that no rational jury could 
have convicted without finding the missing element), cert. denied 
sub nom. Brozek-Lukaszuk v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 63, and 
cert. denied sub nom. Sobiecki v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 63 
(1995). 
 Judge Stapleton takes issue with our understanding of the 
term "functionally equivalent" findings.  While he does not say 
so explicitly, he seems to read Rose v. Clark to allow harmless 
error analysis only when untainted findings, considered without 
reference to the evidence supporting the findings, are logically 
equivalent to the missing element.  Otherwise, he argues, the 
Court engages in impermissible speculation about what a properly 
instructed jury would have decided.  
 We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has not clearly 
defined "functionally equivalent" findings, and thus that there 
is some room for disagreement about the meaning of the term. 
Nevertheless, Judge Stapleton's position lies outside of the 
leeway left by the Supreme Court's pronouncements in this area. 
More importantly, his rule, if adopted, would frustrate the 
purpose of harmless error analysis -- to distinguish immaterial 
errors from those affecting the trial's truth-finding function. 
 Judge Stapleton argues that in Rose the missing element was 
"necessarily inferred" from fact findings in that case, while 
here we impermissibly establish the missing element from "the 
strength of the trial evidence."  We disagree.  Both the Rose 
Court and this Court allowed the missing element to be found by 
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looking at the jury's untainted findings in light of the evidence 
supporting those findings.  In Rose, the trial court 
impermissibly instructed the jury to presume malice from certain 
predicate facts: 
All homicides are presumed to be malicious in the 
absence of evidence which would rebut the implied 
presumption.  Thus, if the State has proven beyond a 
reasonable . . . doubt that a killing has occurred, 
then it is presumed that the killing was done 
maliciously. 
 
Rose, 478 U.S. at 574.  Given this instruction, the jury need 
only have found that a killing had occurred to establish the 
element of malice.  But malice does not necessarily follow from 
the fact of a killing.  Therefore, the established predicate fact 
bore no logical relationship to the missing element.  In Judge 
Stapleton's terms, the fact that a killing has occurred is "as 
consistent" with the nonexistence of malice as it is with the 
existence of malice. 
 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court remanded for application of 
harmless error analysis.  The Court stated: 
When a jury is instructed to presume malice from 
predicate facts, it still must find the existence of 
those facts beyond a reasonable doubt.  In many cases, 
the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so 
that no rational jury could find that the defendant 
committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend 
to cause injury. 
 
Id. at 580-81.  The Court was explicit that this inquiry would 
consider the evidence introduced at trial.  In particular, it 
noted that "[t]he parties disagree on the scope of the evidence 
that must be assessed" on remand.  Id. at 584. n.13; see also id. 
at 583 (making several references to Chapman's requirement that 
38 
the entire record be reviewed).21  In giving directions for 
remand, the Court gave the following example: 
[I]t would defy common sense to conclude that an 
execution-style killing or a violent torture-murder was 
committed unintentionally.  It follows that no rational 
jury would need to rely on an erroneous presumption 
instruction to find malice in such cases. 
 
Id. at 581 n.10.  Presumably, in the example described by the 
Court, the jury would not make findings as to the existence of 
"an execution-style killing or a violent torture-murder." Rather, 
such facts could only be shown by the evidence supporting the 
jury's finding that a homicide had occurred. 
 Our reading of the functional equivalence test -- which 
allows inquiry into evidence necessary to support the jury's 
findings -- is faithful both to the erroneous presumption cases 
and to Sullivan.  Following the erroneous presumption cases, we 
examine the evidence in the record.  However, our analysis 
follows Sullivan's admonition not to speculate on what the jury 
would have found had it been correctly instructed.  By examining 
the evidence necessary to support the jury's findings, we are not 
weighing any evidence, as Judge Stapleton suggests, but simply 
using undisputed evidence to give content to the jury's untainted 
findings.   
                     
21
 Although Justice Scalia's concurrence in Carella criticized a 
broad review of the record in erroneous presumption cases, he has 
not suggested that it is improper to examine the jury's findings 
in light of evidence in the record necessary to establish those 
findings.  Furthermore, Justice Scalia's view of the impact of 
record evidence has not carried a majority of the Court.  Rather, 
the Court has stated that harmless error analysis in erroneous 
presumption cases includes a review of the record.  See Yates, 
500 U.S. at 405-06; Rose, 478 U.S. at 583-84. 
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 Furthermore, our analysis furthers the purpose of harmless 
error analysis: 
  The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle 
that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to 
decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or 
innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal 
process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the 
trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence 
of immaterial error. 
Rose, 478 U.S. at 577 (citations omitted).  In this case, the 
jury was instructed that, to convict, it had to find three 
related predicate offenses and that it had to unanimously find 
that every predicate offense occurred.  All of the evidence 
establishing the predicate offenses showed that they were 
related.  Importantly, Edmonds never even suggested that the 
offenses were unrelated, and nothing in the trial record suggests 
such a conclusion.  In such a case, it requires no speculation to 
see that the error did not affect the verdict.22 
 Accordingly, we hold that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.  The judgment of the 
district court will therefore be affirmed. 
______________________________ 
UNITED STATES v. THEODORE EDMONDS, No. 93-1890  
STAPLETON, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: 
 I join in parts I and II of the court's opinion.  I am 
unable to join part III. 
                     
22
 While Judge Greenberg joins in Judge Garth's opinion that the 
charge was correct, if he concluded that the charge was erroneous 
he would join in Part III of this opinion with respect to 
harmless error. 
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 The court finds that the district court's refusal to require 
unanimity was harmless error.  This is justified, it maintains, 
because the evidence concerning the nine narcotics violations 
which the jury found to have occurred could lead a rational jury 
to no conclusion other than that all were related.  While this 
view has undeniable surface appeal, it is irreconcilably at odds 
with the teaching of Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
Because of Sullivan, I would reverse and remand for a new trial 
on the CCE count. 
 A judge cannot, consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial, direct a verdict for the prosecution no matter how 
overwhelming the evidence of guilt may be.  This Sixth Amendment 
right "includes, of course, as its most important element, the 
right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the 
requisite finding of 'guilty.'"  Id. at 277.  Moreover, the due 
process clause requires that this finding of guilt be a finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  As the Court held in Sullivan, this 
means that the jury must find each of the essential elements of 
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.  If the court's 
instructions to the jury communicate a standard for the 
government's burden of proof less than the beyond a reasonable 
doubt one, there can be "no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-
reasonable doubt."  If there is no such verdict, "[t]here is no 
object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error scrutiny can 
operate," id. at 280, and the defect cannot be cured by a judge's 
finding that "in a trial . . . without the error, a guilty 
verdict would surely have been rendered."  Id. at 279.  As my 
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colleagues purport to recognize, "to hypothesize a guilty verdict 
that was never in fact rendered -- no matter how inescapable the 
findings to support that verdict might be -- would violate the 
jury-trial guarantee."  Id.  
 The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial includes the right 
to a unanimous jury agreement on each element of the offense 
charged, as well as an agreement on each such element beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 
1987).  When this fundamental principle is added to the holding 
in Sullivan, it follows that the constitutionally required jury 
verdict is missing when the jury is not instructed that its 
verdict on each element of the offense must be unanimous.  In 
such a case, "[t]here is no object, so to speak, upon which 
harmless error scrutiny can operate.  The most an appellate court 
can conclude is that a [unanimous] jury would surely have found 
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt -- not that the 
jury's actual [unanimous] finding beyond a reasonable doubt would 
surely not have been different absent the constitutional error." 
Sullivan at 280.   
 This appellate court has determined today only that, given 
the evidence at trial, a jury properly charged would surely have 
unanimously agreed beyond a reasonable doubt that all of Edmonds' 
narcotics violations were related to one another.  Under 
Sullivan, this is not a sufficient basis for affirming his CCE 
conviction. 
 The court distinguishes Sullivan on the ground that Edmonds' 
case is more like a line of mandatory presumption cases which the 
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Supreme Court distinguished in Sullivan.  Id. at 280-81.  In 
cases like Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) and Carella v. 
California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989), the Court indicated that 
harmless error analysis is permissible in some cases where the 
jury has been instructed to apply mandatory presumptions that 
unconstitutionally relieved the state of its burden of proving 
all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  As the 
Court explained in Sullivan, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial is not violated by a harmless error analysis in a mandatory 
presumption case if the predicate facts that the jury had to find 
before the presumption was triggered were "so closely related to 
the ultimate fact to be presumed that no rational jury could find 
those [predicate] facts without also finding that ultimate fact, 
making those findings [the] functional equivalent [of] the 
element required to be presumed."  Sullivan at 281 (quoting from 
Carella, 491 U.S. at 271). 
 This case is not like Rose and Carella, however, and is 
indistinguishable from Sullivan.  In Rose and Carella, the court 
could point to an actual finding made by the jury that was the 
functional equivalent of the element that the jury was required 
to find in order to support a guilty verdict.  In this case, the 
court has not, and cannot, point to such a jury finding.   
 In Rose, for example, the jury was instructed in such a 
manner that the court knew the jury had found either the malice 
required for a murder conviction or predicate acts on the part of 
the defendant from which malice was necessarily inferred.  As the 
Court in Rose noted, "[w]hen a jury is instructed to presume 
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malice from predicate facts, it must still find the existence of 
those facts beyond a reasonable doubt," 478 U.S. at 580, and when 
that finding is the functional equivalent of the element 
required, there is an "object, so to speak, upon which harmless 
error scrutiny can operate."  Sullivan at 280.  In none of the 
mandatory presumption cases where the Supreme Court has approved 
harmless error analysis has the Court relied solely on the 
strength of the trial evidence.  
 In Edmonds' case, the only unanimous jury finding to which 
this court can point is a finding that Edmonds committed nine 
narcotics felonies.  That finding is not the functional 
equivalent of a finding that those felonies were related.  It is 
as consistent with those felonies being unrelated as it is with 
their being related.  My colleagues have not concluded that 
relatedness necessarily follows from a fact the jury found; they 
have, rather, concluded that relatedness necessarily follows from 
the evidence tendered by the government at trial.23  Their 
                     
23
  This critical distinction was emphasized by Justice Scalia, 
writing for four justices, in Carella: 
 
[T]he harmless error analysis applicable in assessing a 
mandatory conclusive presumption in wholly unlike the 
typical form of such analysis.  In the usual case the 
harmlessness determination requires consideration of 
"the trial record as a whole" in order to decide 
whether the fact supported by improperly admitted 
evidence was in any event overwhelmingly established by 
other evidence. 
 
491 U.S. at 267 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  In 
contrast, Justice Scalia explained, the type of harmless error 
analysis applied in mandatory presumption cases seeks to 
determine whether there are jury findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt that are "functionally equivalent" to the missing element.  
The Court adopted Justice Scalia's analysis in Sullivan, and to 
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conclusion does not alter the critical fact under Sullivan --
there is no unanimous jury verdict "upon which harmless-error 
scrutiny can operate."  Id.  United States v. Edmonds, No. 93- 
1890 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
  
 
 I agree with the court that the defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed, but I cannot accept the conclusion that the 
trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the members of the jury 
that they were required to agree unanimously with respect to the 
particular offenses that made up the "continuing series" of 
violations that were necessary for the defendant's conviction 
under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE") statute, 21 
U.S.C. § 848.  Unlike the majority, I am convinced that Congress 
had no intention of imposing such a requirement when it enacted 
the CCE statute.  I also conclude that such an instruction is not 
constitutionally required. 
 For these reasons, I concur in the judgment, but I join only 
part III of the court's opinion, which discusses harmless error. 
I approve this part of the court's opinion because, assuming for 
the sake of argument that the trial judge erred, I agree with the 
court that the error was harmless.  I also join Judge Garth's 
opinion, but I write separately to explain in somewhat different 
                                                                  
the extent this distinction is inconsistent with the terms of the 
remand in Rose, Sullivan, not Rose, is currently the law of the 
land. 
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 I will first address the majority's statutory interpretation 
argument, i.e., its argument that Congress meant to include as 
part of the CCE statute a special jury-unanimity 
requirement that is independent of that contained in Fed. R. Cr. 
P. 31(a) (which simply requires a unanimous "verdict") and of 
constitutional 
requirements (which I discuss in Part II of this opinion).  I 
think that the majority's interpretation of the CCE statute is 
wrong because it has no support in the language or legislative 
history of the CCE statute and because Congress has not followed 
the practice of including special jury-unanimity requirements as 
a part of criminal statutes (other than a few recent statutes 
setting out capital sentencing procedures.)24   
 A.  The pertinent part of the CCE statute, 21 U.S.C. 
§848(c), provides as follows: 
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section [which sets 
out penalties], a person is engaged in a continuing criminal 
enterprise if -- 
 
  (1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or 
subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is a 
felony, and 
 
   (2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of 
violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this 
chapter -- 
 
                     
24See 18 U.S.C. § 3593; 21 U.S.C. § 848(k).  I discuss 21 U.S.C. § 
848(k) in footnote 2, infra. 
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  (A) which are undertaken by such person in concert 
with five or more other persons with respect to whom 
such person occupies a position or organizer, a 
supervisory position, or any other position of 
management, and 
 
   (B) from which such person obtains substantial 
income or resources. 
 
 There is nothing in this language or any other portion of 
the CCE statute that even hints that Congress intended to require 
jury unanimity with respect to the particular offenses needed to 
satisfy 21 U.S.C. §848(c)(2) -- and the majority does not contend 
otherwise.  See Maj. Op at 10.  Indeed, the majority does not 
identify any statutory language that could serve as a reference 
point for its interpretation.  Thus, even if there were extra-
textual support for the proposition that Congress intended to 
impose a special jury-unanimity requirement in CCE cases, the 
majority's interpretation would run into difficulty, for as the 
Supreme Court has noted, "`courts have no authority to enforce 
[a] principl[e] gleaned solely from the legislative history that 
has no statutory reference point.'"  Shannon v. United States, 
114 S.Ct. 2419, 2426 (1994) (citation omitted); accord United 
States v. Fisher, 10 F.3d 115, 120 (3rd Cir. 1993).25 
                     
25It is worth noting that another portion of the CCE statute, 21 
U.S.C. §848(k), expressly requires jury unanimity with respect to 
a different finding.  In 1988, death penalty provisions were 
added to the CCE statute.  See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. 
L. 100 - 690, § 7001, 100 Stat. 4387.  Under one of these new 
provisions, 21 U.S.C. §848(k), a death sentence may be imposed 
only if aggravating factors are found to exist, and this 
provision expressly provides that "[a] finding with respect to 
any aggravating factor must be unanimous."  While this provision 
was enacted well after the portion of the statute, 21 U.S.C 
§848(c), with which we are now concerned, the presence of an 
express jury-unanimity requirement in another subsection of the 
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 B.  Finding no support for a special jury-unanimity 
requirement in the language of §848(c), I turn to the legislative 
history of that provision, and again I find no support.  As the 
majority states, neither the parties nor the majority itself has 
unearthed any indication in the legislative history that Congress 
intended to adopt such a special requirement.  See Maj. Op. at 
17.  Thus, the two sources on which we most frequently rely in 
interpreting statutes, the statutory language and the legislative 
history, provide no basis for holding that §848(c) contains a 
special jury-unanimity requirement -- or even for concluding that 
there is any ambiguity on this point. 
 C.  If this is not enough to refute the majority's 
interpretation, any remaining doubt must vanish when it is noted 
that Congress has not customarily included special jury-unanimity 
requirements in federal criminal statutes (other than the few I 
mentioned earlier that concern capital sentencing procedures). 
Indeed, I have not found any federal criminal statutes outside 
the field of capital sentencing that contain special unanimity 
requirements.  If I have overlooked any, I hope that my 
colleagues in the majority will call them to my attention.  But 
if I am right that Congress, as a uniform or general practice, 
has not adopted such special unanimity requirements, that 
                                                                  
CCE statute weighs against the proposition that Congress, in 
enacting §848(c), intended to impose an analogous requirement but 
either felt that it was unnecessary or neglected to insert any 
statutory language manifesting such an intent.  The express jury 
unanimity requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) "shows that Congress 
knew how to draft [such a requirement] when it wanted to."  City 
of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1593 
(1994). 
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practice seems to me to be telling.  With no congressional custom 
of adopting such special unanimity requirements and no hint in 
the statutory language or legislative history that Congress meant 
to break new ground and impose such a requirement under §848(c), 
I think that the majority's interpretation can confidently be 
rejected. 
 D.  The majority claims that its interpretation of §848(c) 
is supported by two canons of construction -- the rule of lenity 
and the rule that an ambiguous statute should be interpreted 
where possible to avoid "`grave and doubtful constitutional 
questions.'"  Maj. Op. 21 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney 
General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909)).  Neither 
of these canons, however, is applicable here.  Both canons may 
properly be invoked only when the statute in question is 
legitimately ambiguous on the point at issue.  These canons are, 
after all, tools for identifying, not overriding, congressional 
intent.  As the Supreme Court recently noted, the rule of lenity 
"applies only if, `after seizing everything from which aid can be 
derived,' we can make `no more than a guess as to what Congress 
intended.'"  Reno v. Koray, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 2029 (1995) (citation 
omitted); See also United States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 901 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (rule of lenity "operates only after it is determined 
that a criminal statute is ambiguous, not at the beginning of the 
process of construction, as an overriding consideration of being 
lenient to wrongdoers") (citation and internal quotations 
omitted); United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1390 (6th Cir. 
1996) (when applying the rule of lenity courts should not go to 
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extreme lengths to characterize criminal statutes as ambiguous 
when they can be read as relatively well-defined); United States 
v. Valencia-Andrade, 72 F.3d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1996) (rule of 
lenity serves as aid for resolving ambiguity; it is not used to 
beget one).  Likewise, "resort to an alternative construction to 
avoid deciding a constitutional question is appropriate only when 
such a course is `fairly possible' or when the statue provides a 
`fair alternative' construction."  Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 
372, 378 n.11 (1977); See also Friedrich v. United States, 974 
F.2d 409, 418-19 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Although a statute should be 
interpreted in a fashion that does not defeat the congressional 
purpose, . . . a court may not rewrite an unambiguous law") 
(citation omitted); United States v. Salisbury, 983 F.2d 1369, 
1380 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1310 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) (court may not read limitation into 
statute to avoid constitutional issue where no language in 
statute supports such interpretation).  In this case, therefore, 
in the absence of any ambiguity as to whether Congress intended 
to include a special jury-unanimity requirement in §848(c) -- and 
for the reasons explained above, I see no such ambiguity --
neither of the canons advances the majority's argument. 
 E.  The only remaining source of authority invoked by the 
majority -- and thus the sole pillar on which its entire 
statutory construction argument rests -- is its understanding of 
"general historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence."  Maj. 
Op. at 19.  The majority states:  
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Criminal trials have long ensured substantial jury agreement 
as to the facts establishing the offense.  This is because 
criminal statutes and the common law have generally defined 
crimes in terms of conduct (and accompanying mental state) 
that takes place in a single place at some specific time. 
For example, murder statutes require that the defendant 
killed some other person, an act occurring in some specified 
time and place.  Thus, when a jury delivers a general guilty 
verdict for such a crime, we are confident that the jury 
agreed on most of the actions engaged in by the defendant. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 The majority cites no authority for this reading of "general 
historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence," and I believe 
that the majority has overstated the principle that can 
legitimately be drawn from established criminal law precedents. 
To be sure, our law has traditionally demanded a degree of 
specificity in criminal prosecutions.  Many rules of law, 
including those governing charging instruments26 and bills of 
particulars,27 work toward this end.  But it is simply not true 
that the jury is always required to "agree[] on most of the 
actions engaged in by the defendant."  Maj. Op. at 19.  Nor is it 
true that the prosecution has invariably28 been required to 
                     
26See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 3 (a complaint sets out "the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged"); Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 7(c)(1) (the indictment or the information must set out "the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged."). 
27See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f). 
28I am aware that the majority states that "criminal statutes and 
the common law have generally defined crimes in terms of conduct 
(and accompanying mental state) that takes place in a single 
place at some specified time."  Maj. Op. at 19 (emphasis added).  
If this rule is only "generally" true, however, then there must 
be instances in which it is not true.  And if that is so, then I 
think it is incumbent upon the majority to explain when the rule 
does not apply and why the present case is not analogous to those 
in which this rule has not traditionally held true.  The majority 
provides no such explanation.     
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establish the "specified time and place" where a charged offense 
occurred.  Id.     
 In invoking "general historical tradition in criminal 
jurisprudence," the majority relies on the law of murder, but I 
believe that this body of law exposes the weakness of the 
majority's analysis.  It is not correct, for example, that in a 
murder case the jury is required to "agree[] on most of the 
actions engaged in by the defendant."  Maj. Op. at 19.  Both the 
holding and the controlling opinions in Schad v. Arizona, 501 
U.S. 624 (1991), illustrate this point.   
 Under the holding of Schad, which followed traditional 
practice (see id. at 640-42 (opinion of Souter, J.); id. at 648-
50 (opinion of Scalia, J.)), a defendant may be convicted of 
first-degree murder even if some of the jurors base their guilty 
votes on the theory of felony-murder and others do not.  Suppose, 
therefore, that the evidence in a murder case shows that the 
victim was driving in a remote area when he picked up the 
defendant, who was hitchhiking.  Suppose that the victim's body 
is later found at the bottom of a cliff, that the medical 
examiner attributes death to a fall, that the defendant is later 
stopped while driving the victim's car and is found to have made 
many purchases using the victim's credit cards, and that forensic 
evidence ties the defendant to the victim's death.  Suppose that 
six jurors conclude that the defendant deliberately pushed the 
victim off the cliff but that the remaining six jurors think that 
the victim accidentally fell to his death while attempting to 
flee from the defendant, who was robbing him.  Schad teaches that 
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the jury could find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder 
despite this important disagreement about the defendant's 
conduct.   
 Moreover, even if the jurors in a murder case all agree that 
the defendant intentionally killed the victim, both Justice 
Souter's and Justice Scalia's opinions in Schad make clear that 
the jurors need not agree on how the killing was accomplished. 
Justice Souter discussed Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481 
(1898), in which the Court upheld a murder conviction despite the 
fact that the indictment did not specify whether the death was 
caused by shooting or drowning.  See 501 U.S. at 631.  He then 
observed: 
We have never suggested that in returning general verdicts 
in such cases the jurors should be required to agree upon a 
single means of commission. . . .  In these cases, as in 
litigation generally, "different jurors may be persuaded by 
different pieces of evidence, even when they agree upon the 
bottom line. . . ." 
 
501 U.S. at 631-32 (citation omitted).  Justice Scalia made the  
 
same point by means of a hypothetical.  He wrote: 
When a woman's charred body has been found in a burned 
house, and there is ample evidence that the defendant set 
out to kill her, it would be absurd to set him free because 
six jurors believe he strangled her to death (and caused the 
fire accidentally in his hasty escape), while six others 
believe he left her unconscious and set the fire to kill 
her. 
 
501 U.S. at 650 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Thus, it seems clear 
to me that the majority is wrong in saying that under traditional 
practice the jury in a murder case must always "agree[] on most 
of the actions engaged in by the defendant."  Maj. Op. 19. 
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 Nor is the prosecution in a murder case always required to 
nail down the "specified time" or "specified . . . place" of the 
killing.  To take another hypothetical case, suppose that a 
motorist is seen picking up a hitchhiker at one end of a state 
and that the hitchhiker is stopped many days later at the other 
end of the state driving the motorist's car.   Suppose also that 
blood stains are found in the trunk, that the motorist's bullet-
ridden body is discovered in a wooded area in another part of the 
state and that other evidence tying the hitchhiker to the crime 
is gathered.  Would anybody suggest that the hitchhiker cannot be 
convicted unless the prosecution can prove specifically where and 
when the killing occurred?   
 In short, I do not think that it is possible to distill from 
"general historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence" the 
principle that the jury must always "agree[] on most of the 
actions engaged in by the defendant" or the principle that the 
prosecution must always prove that a charged offense occurred at 
a specific place or time.  Instead, I think that our law has 
traditionally allowed some flexibility with respect to these 
matters, and thus I do not discern any traditional practice that 
provides appreciable support for the majority's interpretation of 
§848(c).  Certainly I do not see anything that can begin to 
overcome the lack of support for that interpretation in either 
the statutory language or the legislative history and the absence 
of any congressional practice of imposing special jury-unanimity 
requirements as part of criminal statutes (other than the few I 
mentioned concerning capital sentencing).  I therefore conclude 
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that §848(c) does not include any special jury-unanimity 
requirement. 
 
     II. 
 A.  Because I reject the majority's statutory interpretation 
argument, I now turn to the question whether the Constitution 
obligated the trial judge in this case to instruct the members of 
the jury that they were required to reach unanimous agreement as 
to the particular offenses that made up the "continuing series" 
of violations that the defendant committed.  Because this is a 
federal case, the only  constitutional provision relevant to the 
issue of jury-unanimity, in my view, is the Sixth Amendment. 
Unlike the majority, I do not think that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment has any bearing on this issue.29  See Maj. 
Op. 21.   
                     
29My evaluation of the constitutional issue presented in this case 
would not change if I believed that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment were applicable here, but I do not think that it 
is.   
 
    The Sixth Amendment expressly guarantees the right to "trial 
by jury" and has been held to require a unanimous verdict in a 
federal criminal prosecution.  See 12-13, infra.  The Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, of course, provides general 
protection for "liberty."  "Where a particular amendment 
`provides an explicit textual source of constitutional 
protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 
`that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of "substantive 
due process," must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'"  
Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994)(plurality)(quoting 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).  See also id. at 814 
(Scalia, J., concurring); cf. id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring); id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 819-22 
(Souter, J., concurring).  Furthermore, the proposition that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees jury 
unanimity to a greater degree than does the Sixth Amendment seems 
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 B.  The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a "trial by 
jury" in "all criminal prosecutions" in federal court.  In 
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), and Apodaca v. Oregon, 
406 U.S. 404 (1973), five Justices concluded that this right 
includes the right to a unanimous verdict.  Justice Powell, who 
cast the deciding vote, reasoned as follows: 
[I]n amending the Constitution to guarantee the right to 
jury trial, the framers desired to preserve the jury 
safeguard as it was known to them at common law.  At the 
time the Bill of Rights was adopted, unanimity had long been 
established as one of the attributes of a jury conviction at 
common law.  It therefore seems to me, in accord both with 
history and precedent, that the Sixth Amendment requires a 
unanimous jury verdict to convict in a federal criminal 
trial. 
 
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 371 (Opinion of Powell, J.)  
 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 As the highlighted portion of Justice Powell's opinion 
states, the common law and American practice at the time of the 
                                                                  
to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court decisions holding that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires less 
jury unanimity than does the Sixth Amendment.  See Johnson v. 
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 464 
(1972).   
    In Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), both the plurality 
opinion (see id. at 632-645) and Justice Scalia's concurrence 
(see id. at 649-652) discussed the constitutional restrictions 
imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because Schad was a state prosecution and the Sixth Amendment's 
implicit guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict is not applicable 
to the states.  Johnson v. Louisiana, supra; Apodaca v. Oregon, 
supra. (This is my interpretation of the main thrust of footnote 
5 of the Schad plurality opinion (501 U.S. at 634 n.5), which the 
majority discusses.  See Maj. Op. 30 n.16.) 
 
    Some of the hypothetical statutes mentioned in the Schad 
plurality opinion and in Justice Scalia's concurrence could raise 
due process concerns unrelated to the question of jury unanimity. 
But insofar as jury unanimity is concerned, I see no 
justification for looking further than the Sixth Amendment. 
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adoption of the Bill of Rights required a unanimous jury verdict 
-- and, as far as I am aware, nothing more.30  And subject to the 
proviso discussed in part II C of this opinion, I do not think 
that the Sixth Amendment goes any further.  Thus, in my view, the 
Sixth Amendment requires that jurors be instructed regarding the 
elements of the offense with which the defendant is charged, and 
each juror, before deciding to vote "guilty," must decide in his 
or her own mind that every element was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  When the jurors vote, they must unanimously vote "guilty" 
in order for there to be a conviction.  But assuming that they 
all vote "guilty," the Sixth Amendment unanimity requirement does 
not demand anything more.  It does not require unanimity with 
respect to any subsidiary factual determinations that the 
individual jurors may have made in their own minds before casting 
their votes. 
 Under this approach, it is apparent that the breadth of the 
legislative definition of an offense substantially affects the 
degree of unanimity that is required.  The more narrowly an 
offense is defined, the less room there will be for jurors to 
disagree on subsidiary factual matters.  And the more broadly an 
offense is defined, the more room there will be for such 
                     
30See, e.g., 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *376; Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, sec. 8 (protecting right "to a speedy 
trial by an impartial jury of [the] vicinage, without whose 
unanimous consent [a defendant] cannot be found guilty"); 
Delaware Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules, § 14 
(protecting "right to a speedy Trial by an impartial Jury, 
without whose unanimous Consent [a defendant] ought not to be 
found Guilty"); Vt. Constitution of 1777 ch. 1, art. X (defendant 
cannot be found guilty without "the unanimous consent" of the 
"jury"). 
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disagreement.  Suppose that State A defines first-degree murder 
as knowingly or purposely causing the death of another person. 
Suppose that State B defines first-degree murder as knowingly or 
purposely causing the death of another human being or causing the 
death of another human during the commission of a felony.  The 
degree of unanimity required in State A is greater than in State 
B because in the latter a defendant could be convicted of first-
degree murder even if some jurors think that he caused the death 
knowingly or purposely and others think he merely caused the 
death during the commission of a felony.  But as Schad instructs, 
the scheme adopted by State B does not offend the Constitution.   
 C.  I now come to the proviso to which I previously 
referred.  Because of the relationship noted above between the 
breadth of the legislative definition of an offense and the 
degree of jury-unanimity needed to produce a unanimous verdict, 
Congress could circumvent the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a 
unanimous verdict by lumping together incongruous elements under 
the rubric of a single offense.  I do not think that the Sixth 
Amendment would tolerate such a stratagem.  If a new offense 
contained a combination of elements having no rational basis 
other than the evasion of the Sixth Amendment's jury unanimity 
requirement, that combination would be unconstitutional. 
 In Schad, both Justice Souter's and Justice Scalia's 
opinions pointed out that there could be extreme circumstances in 
which the Constitution would require jury-unanimity with respect 
to something other than the jury's general verdict of guilty. 
Justice Souter's opinion recognized that the meaning of the right 
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to a unanimous verdict in a particular case depends on the 
legislative definition of the offense with which the defendant is 
charged, and he noted that this right could be undermined if a 
legislative body simply lumped together incongruous elements 
under the rubric of a single offense.  501 U.S. at 630-33. 
Concluding that the Constitution would not permit such a ploy, he 
observed that "nothing in our history suggests that the Due 
Process Clause would permit a State to convict anyone under a 
charge of `Crime' so generic that any combination of jury 
findings of embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax 
evasion, or littering, for example, would suffice for 
conviction."  Id. at 633 (footnote omitted).   
 Justice Souter stressed, however, that considerable 
deference should be given to a legislative judgment concerning 
the definition of a criminal offense -- or, in other words, to a 
legislative judgment that a particular combination of elements 
should be regarded as constituting a single rather than multiple 
offenses.  See id. at 637-40.  He spoke of "a threshold 
presumption of legislative competence,"  the importance of 
"judicial restraint," and the need to avoid "judicial second-
guessing."  Id. at 637-38.  Emphasizing that a legislature's 
"`definition of the elements of [an] offense is usually 
dispositive,'" he nevertheless made clear that  "`there are 
obviously constitutional limits beyond which [a legislative body] 
may not go."  Id. at 639 (citation omitted).  In deciding whether 
these limits have been violated, he concluded, both "history and 
widely shared practices" are instructive.  Id. at 640.  He also 
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observed that, when a statute sets out alternative elements, it 
is appropriate to consider whether they can reasonably be viewed 
as reflecting "notions of equivalent blameworthiness or 
culpability" or whether, as in his previous example of the 
offense of "Crime," no such view of the definition can reasonably 
be entertained.  Id. at 643. 
 Justice Scalia's concurrence set out a similar but not 
identical analysis.  He noted that "one can conceive of novel 
`umbrella' crimes (a felony consisting of either robbery or 
failure to file a tax return) where permitting a 6-to-6 verdict 
would seem contrary to due process."  Id. at 650 (Scalia, J. 
concurring).  In a somewhat similar vein, he later added that 
"[w]e would not permit . . . an indictment charging that the 
defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday."  Id. 
at 651.  Applying his view that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not proscribe deeply rooted historical 
practices, he concluded that Arizona's definition of murder, 
which represented the historical norm, did not violate due 
process.  Id. at 651.  Since Schad grew out of a state 
prosecution, both these opinions discussed the requirements of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than 
the Sixth Amendment, but I believe that it is appropriate to 
translate their discussion into Sixth Amendment terms. 
 Under either Justice Souter's or Justice Scalia's analysis, 
Congress's definition of a "continuing criminal enterprise" does 
not, in my opinion, exceed the broad limits allowed for 
legislative judgment in determining whether particular elements 
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should be combined to form a single offense.  I readily 
acknowledge that the CCE statute, unlike the Arizona murder 
statute at issue in Schad, is not based on a long and widely 
accepted model but instead, as I discuss below, represents a 
innovative approach developed by Congress some 25 years ago.  In 
light of these origins, the CCE statute cannot claim the 
protection from constitutional challenge that a more traditional 
criminal statute might enjoy, but this does not mean that the CCE 
statute is automatically suspect.  As patterns of crime change, 
legislative bodies must have the freedom, within constitutional 
limits, to devise new ways of responding to those changes, 
including the creation of new crimes that are not closely 
modelled on any common law antecedents.   
 Although the CCE statute does not enjoy the protection of 
ancient lineage, I believe that both its structure and background 
support its constitutionality and comfortably distinguish it from 
the examples of impermissible statutes that were cited in the 
Schad plurality and concurring opinions.  Justice Souter's 
example -- an offense called "Crime" that would require proof 
that the defendant committed at least one act of "embezzlement, 
reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering" 
(501 U.S. at 633 (opinion of Souter, J.)) -- seems to represent a 
combination of elements having no rational basis other than the 
circumvention of otherwise applicable jury-unanimity 
requirements.  No element other than proof of one of the 
predicate offense appears to be necessary for conviction, and the 
predicate offenses are widely dissimilar.  It is hard to imagine 
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what legitimate basis there could be for such a combination of 
elements. 
 The hypothetical laws discussed by Justice Scalia seem to me 
to have similar flaws.  What legitimate basis could there be for 
creating a crime "consisting of either robbery or failure to file 
a tax return" or permitting a defendant to be prosecuted for the 
offense of assaulting "either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday"? 
See 501 U.S. at 651 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 The CCE statute differs sharply from these monstrosities. 
For one thing, there are important structural differences.  The 
CCE statute sets out several elements in addition to the 
commission of the predicate offenses that must be proven in every 
case.  Specifically, it must be shown, not only that the 
defendant committed a "continuing series of violations," but that 
(a) he undertook this activity "in concert with five or more 
other persons," (b) that "with respect to [these persons] he 
occupie[d] a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or 
any other position of management," and (c) that he "obtain[ed] 
substantial income or resources" from this series of violations. 
21 U.S.C. §848(c).  The presence of these additional elements 
supports the view that the CCE statute represents an effort to 
define a distinct type of criminal activity.  
 The background of the CCE statute fortifies this view.  The 
CCE statute was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 
1236.  After study and consideration, Congress concluded that 
drug abuse was "approaching epidemic proportions," that existing 
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federal drug laws were inadequate, and that new approaches were 
needed.  H.R. Rep. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 6, reprinted 
in  1970 U.S. Cong. & Admin. News 4566, 4571-72.  The CCE statute 
represented one such innovative approach.  Drafted to address 
what Congress considered a rapidly growing problem, this statute 
departed significantly from common law models and prior drug 
laws.  Much like the RICO statute, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-64, 
which was passed at roughly the same time, the CCE statute 
created a new crime by reference to a criminal organization or 
"enterprise."  In enacting both of these ground-breaking 
statutes, it was apparently Congress's judgment that a new 
organizational approach was necessary in order to mount an 
effective attack on criminal groups that were causing great 
societal damage.   
 To my mind, this background must be taken into account in 
considering whether Congress exceeded constitutional bounds by 
creating the offense set out in 21 U.S.C §848(c).  This 
background shows, I believe, that Congress had a rational and 
legitimate basis for crafting the particular combination of 
elements required under 21 U.S.C §848(c)(2).  Specifically, this 
background demonstrates that it was the judgment of Congress that 
a new type of criminal activity was growing in importance and 
that a new type of criminal statute, keyed to the organizational 
scope of that activity, was needed.  This legislative judgment, 
in my view, is entitled to substantial respect.  See Schad, 501 
U.S. at 637-39 (opinion of Souter, J.). 
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 Based on the structure and background of the CCE statute, I 
am persuaded that the statute does not contravene the Sixth 
Amendment's jury unanimity requirement but instead constitutes a 
permissible of exercise of Congress's broad power to define the 
scope of federal criminal offenses.   
 
    III. 
 For these reasons, I do not think that the trial judge in 
this case erred in refusing to instruct the members of the jury 
that they were required to agree unanimously on the predicate 
offenses committed by the defendant.  If the trial judge had 
erred, however, I think that the error would be harmless for the 
reasons explained in part III of the opinion of the court.   
 
 
United States v. Theodore Edmonds 
No. 93-1890 
 




GARTH, Circuit Judge, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part, 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge, GREENBERG, NYGAARD, ALITO and ROTH, 
Circuit Judges, Join in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion. 
 
 
 While I agree that Edmonds' conviction must be sustained, I 
cannot agree that any error was committed by the district court. 
Because there was no error, it is a needless exercise to address 
whether that error was harmless. 
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 Congress has never required a unanimous finding for each and 
every component of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE") 
statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848(c).  Therefore, in my opinion, the jury 
was not required to unanimously agree on which three predicate 
acts constituted the "continuing series of violations" for 
purposes of the CCE statute, as Echeverri required, and which the 
majority of the Court now reaffirms. 
 
I. 
 In this case, we have been asked to decide whether the 
identities of the predicate acts constituting the "continuing 
series of violations" prong of the CCE statute are so essential 
to proof of the CCE offense that the identity of each predicate 
act must be agreed upon unanimously by the jury;  or whether the 
identities of the predicate acts are merely alternative means of 
committing the same CCE offense or preliminary facts required to 
establish the offense, such that unanimity is not required under 
the Supreme Court's decision in Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 
(1991). 
 The plain reading and meaning of the CCE statute does not 
require the identification of the particular predicate acts as an 
element of the CCE offense.  Therefore, the jury need not have 
unanimously agreed on the same three predicate acts constituting 
the "continuing series" in convicting Edmonds of CCE. 
Accordingly, the district court did not err in failing to give 
such a specific unanimity instruction. 
A. 
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 In order for the government to make out the offense of 
conducting a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined by 21 
U.S.C. § 848(c), it must show that: 
(1)  the defendant committed a drug-related felony, 21 
U.S.C. 848(c)(1);   
 
(2)  the felony was "a part of a continuing series of 
violations" of the drug laws;  21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) 
(emphasis added);   
 
(3)  the defendant undertook that drug-related felony 
"in concert with five or more other persons with 
respect to whom [the defendant] occupied a position of 
organizer, a supervisory position, or any other 
position of management," 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(A);  and 
 
(4) the defendant obtained substantial income or 
resources from these violations.  21 U.S.C. §848(c)(B). 
 
 The district court had instructed the jury that "[a] 
continuing series of violations requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that three or more violations occurred and that 
they, those three or more, were related to each other."  App. 
577.  The district court also instructed the jury that "[y]ou are 
asked to deliberate with a view towards reaching a unanimous 
decision with respect to each count and each defendant charged 
here in this indictment."  App. 581.  The only issue before us on 
appeal is whether the district court erred in failing to instruct 
the jury that in order to convict Edmonds of engaging in a CCE, 
it must unanimously agree as to which three predicate acts 
constituted the "continuing series of violations" under the CCE 
statute. 
 Nowhere in the language or legislative history of the CCE 
statute does Congress evince a concern regarding the particular 
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nature or identity of the predicate acts constituting the 
"continuing series of violations."  Aside from requiring that the 
"violations" be drug-related offenses, Congress has not imposed 
limits on what predicate acts constitute a "violation."  The 
courts, at liberty to define this statute, have generally held 
that "violations" refer broadly to offenses, including unindicted 
offenses, whether or not they led to convictions.  See United 
States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987);  United States v. Markowski, 
772 F.2d 358, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1018 
(1986).  Congress has not even defined the number of predicate 
acts required to form a "series."  Thus, while some courts of 
appeal have required three predicate acts, see United States v. 
Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 642 (3d Cir. 1988);  United States v. 
Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
480 U.S. 919 (1987), another court has required only two.  See 
United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 947 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992). 
 Indeed, the statute itself does not require that the 
violations be "related," although the courts have uniformly read 
such a "relatedness" requirement into the definition of 
"continuing series."  See e.g. United States v. Rodriguez-
Aguirre, -- F.3d --, 1996 WL 8119, *4 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996). 
B. 
 The broadness with which Congress defined a "continuing 
series of violations" indicates that the exact identities of the 
predicate offenses necessary for a jury to find a "continuing 
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series" for purposes of the CCE statute are not essential facts 
constituting an element of the offense.  Rather, the predicate 
offenses are no more than alternative means of, or preliminary 
facts, establishing the element of "continuing series."  In Schad 
v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 633 (1991), the Supreme Court held that 
facts that constitute merely alternative means of, or preliminary 
facts to, proving a single offense need not receive the unanimous 
agreement of the jury. 
 In Schad, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the 
jury was not required to unanimously agree on whether the 
defendant Schad had committed premeditated murder or felony-
murder in order to convict him under the Arizona first-degree 
murder statute.  That statute provided that first-degree murder 
was only one crime, regardless of whether it occurred as a 
premeditated murder or a felony murder.  The Supreme Court stated 
that: 
Our cases reflect a long-established rule of the 
criminal law that an indictment need not specify which 
overt act, among several named, was the means by which 
a crime was committed. . . . We have never suggested 
that in returning general verdicts in such cases the 
jurors should be required to agree upon a single means 
of commission, any more than the indictment were 
required to specify one alone.  In these cases, as in 
litigation generally, "different jurors may be 
persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when 
they agree upon the bottom line.  Plainly there is no 
general requirement that the jury reach agreement on 
the preliminary factual issues which underlie the 
verdict." 
 
Id. at 631-32 (quotation omitted).  Thus the Court rejected 
requiring jury unanimity on the "mere means of satisfying a 
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single element of an offense," noting that such a requirement 
would lead to "absurd results."  Id. at 636 n.6. 
 The Schad Court recognized that there were due process 
limits to the state's authority to define what facts constitute 
merely alternative means of committing a single offense.  The 
Court stated that: 
[N]othing in our history suggests that the Due Process 
Clause would permit a State to convict anyone under a 
charge of "Crime" so generic that any combination of 
jury findings of embezzlement, reckless driving, 
murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering, for 
example, would suffice for conviction. 
 
Schad, 501 U.S. at 63.  There comes a point, the Court 
recognized, when "differences between means become so important 
that they may not reasonably be viewed as alternatives to a 
common end, but must be treated as differentiating what the 
Constitution requires to be treated as separate offenses." Schad, 
501 U.S. at 633.  In the case of the Arizona murder statute, the 
Court held that due process was not violated because the state 
legislature had determined that premeditated murder was "morally 
equivalent" to felony murder.  Id. at 644. 
 In the present case, the CCE statute clearly provides for 
conviction for engaging in a CCE regardless of the identity, 
level of seriousness, or differing penalties of the predicate 
acts constituting the "continuing series of violations."  Because 
any grouping of multiple related drug offenses will satisfy this 
element of the statute, and because different groupings of 
predicate acts do not define separate crimes, the identities of 
the specific predicate acts constituting the "continuing series" 
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do not rise to facts so "indispensable to proof of a given 
offense," Schad, 501 U.S. at 633, that they must be agreed to 
unanimously by the jury.  If we were to hold otherwise, we would 
in effect be establishing a rule requiring jury unanimity as to 
every predicate fact underlying the second prong of the CCE 
statute.  Indeed, the majority opinion has furnished us with no 
explanation as to how its analysis can result in a conclusion 
that Congress intended just this one prong of a four-prong 
statute to require jury unanimity as to the identity of the three 
predicate acts and not require jury unanimity as to the factual 
underpinnings of the other components of the CCE. 
 Certainly, the majority opinion has furnished us with no 
clue as to why just this requirement of the CCE statute 
("continuing series of violations")  must be distinguished from 
the other three requirements of the statute.   
 While the first CCE prong (commission of a drug-related 
felony) requires only a single determination, the other three CCE 
prongs cannot be satisfied by a single determination and they 
therefore potentially raise unanimity issues.  If the majority's 
analysis is correct, then it would inexorably follow that all 
five or more individuals - the subject of the third CCE prong -
must likewise be identified and agreed upon by each member of the 
jury.  Yet we have held, and the majority apparently agrees with 
that holding, (Maj. Op. at 25), that this is not required.  See 
United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1989) (unanimity 
on five or more supervised individuals not required).   
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 Similarly, and just as illogically under the majority's 
analysis, with respect to the CCE requirement that a defendant 
must have derived "substantial income or resources" from his drug 
violations, it would appear that the majority would also require 
unanimity as to the factual findings and identities of such 
income or resources.  Would the jury have to identify the cash, 
property, airplanes, automobiles (Mercedes, Lexus, BMW), yachts, 
etc. and agree unanimously on the particular resource which the 
defendant received? 
 Such a construction - singling out and selecting one of four 
statutory requirements and interpreting an unarticulated 
congressional intent requiring unanimity only with respect to 
that one prong of a four-prong statute - is not supported by any 
precedent, any logic, or any reason.  Nor can the majority's 
unsupported argument, that such a construction is mandated, 
supply that authority.  In sum, "'there is no general requirement 
that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues 
which underlie the verdict.'"  Schad, 501 U.S. at 632 (quoting 
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 (1990) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring)). 
C. 
 Not requiring specific unanimity on the predicate acts 
constituting the "continuing series of violations" is consistent 
with our holding in United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85 (3d 
Cir. 1989), where we held that there need not be unanimous 
agreement among the jury as to the identities of the five or more 
persons making up the group of underlings supervised, organized, 
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or managed by the defendant for purposes of the CCE statute.31 
 The majority attempts to distinguish Jackson by arguing that 
the five-person requirement, unlike the continuing series 
requirement, has a "historical analogue in the law of conspiracy, 
which generally has not required the jury to unanimously agree on 
the identity of the defendant's co-conspirators."  (Maj. Op. at 
25).  The applicability of the law of conspiracy to substantive 
CCE offenses is open to question.  Moreover, even if the law of 
conspiracy were applicable here, it is clear that the continuing 
series requirement enjoys as much of a "historical analogue" as 
does the five-person requirement.  Notably, in the case of a 
multiple-object conspiracy, a jury need not unanimously agree as 
to which object of the various charged objects forms the basis 
for their conviction of a defendant for conspiracy. See, e.g., 
United States v. Linn, 31 F.3d 787, 991 (10th Cir. 1994);  United 
States v. Peral-Cota, 1993 WL 68934, *4 (9th Cir. 1993).32   
                     
31At least seven other circuits have not required unanimity with 
respect to the identity of the five underlings in the CCE 
statute.  See United States v. Jelinek, 57 F.3d 655, 658 (8th 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 236 (1995);  United States 
v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 932 
(1992);  United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992);  United States v. Moorman, 944 
F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 
1007 (1992);  United States v. English, 925 F.2d 154, 159 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991);  United States v. 
Linn, 889 F.2d 1369, 1374 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
809 (1990); United States v. Tarvers, 833 F.2d 1068, 1074 (1st 
Cir. 1987).   
32Indeed, as the Supreme Court has held, "[w]hen a jury returns a 
guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the 
conjunctive, . . . the verdict stands if the evidence is 
sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged."  Griffin 
v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1991) (quoting Turner v. 
United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970)).  
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     The majority also argues that Jackson is distinguishable 
because "acting in concert with one group of five people is no 
more or less blameworthy than acting in concert with another 
group of five."  (Maj. Op. at 26).  However, as discussed infra, 
the CCE statute clearly provides that engaging in one group of 
related predicate acts is as equally blameworthy as engaging in 
another group of related predicate acts.  Just as the exact 
identities of the five supervised individuals are preliminary 
factual findings or mere alternative means to proving a CCE 
offense, the exact identities of the predicate acts constituting 
the "continuing series of violations" are also preliminary 
factual findings or mere alternative means to proving a CCE 
offense and thus need not be the subject of jury unanimity.  See 
United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 350-51 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(holding that the district court's failure to instruct the jurors 
that they were required to agree unanimously on the particular 
predicate acts committed and the identities of the five 
individuals managed in order to convict the defendant for 
violation of the CCE statute was not plain error), cert. denied, 
116 S. Ct. 542 (1995);  United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 
948 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that juror unanimity was not 
required on the identities of the predicate offenses constituting 
the "continuing series" because "[t]he constitutional requirement 
of juror unanimity in federal criminal offenses is satisfied when 
each juror in a CCE trial is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
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that a defendant charged under the CCE statute committed two 
predicate offenses."), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992).33 
 
D. 
 The district court's general unanimity instruction 
sufficiently ensured that the jury would unanimously agree that a 
"continuing series of violations," that is, three or more related 
drug offenses, occurred.  Thus, I find that the district court 




 Today, the majority purports to "affirm" or "reaffirm" our 
decision in United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 
1988).  The majority, conceding that neither the language nor 
legislative history of the CCE statute requires specific 
unanimity, strains to justify its position by resorting to 
"background interpretive principles," including the "tradition in 
criminal jurisprudence," constitutional considerations, and the 
rule of lenity.  In my view, these "background interpretive 
                     
33See also United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 486-87 (7th Cir. 
1992) (rejecting defendants' contention that the jury should have 
been instructed that it must unanimously agree as to each of the 
two or more predicate offenses constituting the "continuing 
series" of CCE, where the court had given a general unanimity 
instruction), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 998 (1992); United States v. 
Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560 (9th Cir. 1989) (specific 
unanimity instruction not required where the jury had convicted 
the defendant of two the eleven predicate offenses alleged in the 
CCE count, and where there was "overwhelming" evidence at trial 
that the other charged predicate acts had occurred), cert. 
denied, 497 U.S. 1003 (1990). 
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principles" cannot support the ambitious proposition for which 
they are invoked by the majority. 
A. 
 First, the majority argues that under the "general 
historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence," "[c]riminal 
trials have long ensured substantial jury agreement as to the 
facts establishing the offense."  (Maj. Op. at 18).    In so 
arguing, the majority glosses over and fails to answer the 
central dilemma in the case:  how we are to determine which facts 
require or do not require unanimous jury agreement. 
 Clearly, not all of the facts underlying a verdict require 
jury unanimity.  See Schad, supra.  In failing to define what 
"facts" require jury unanimity or not, the majority's argument 
does not supply a satisfactory, authoritative, or logical answer 
as to whether the identities of the three predicate acts 
constituting a "continuing series of violations" for purposes of 
CCE require jury unanimity. 
B. 
 Next, the majority argues that "[t]here is a real 
possibility that the CCE statute would violate the Due Process 
Clause absent a specific unanimity requirement."  (Maj. Op. at 
19).  The majority, however, cannot find a principled way to 
argue that due process was violated in this case when it was not 
violated in Schad. 
 In Schad, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause 
was not violated when the defendant was convicted of first-degree 
murder despite the lack of assurance that the jury unanimously 
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agreed as to whether the defendant had committed premeditated 
murder or felony murder.  The majority argues that this result 
was defensible in Schad only because premeditated murder and 
felony murder are of "equivalent blameworthiness or culpability" 
(Maj. Op. at 20 (quoting Schad, 501 U.S. at 643));  and that in 
the present case, the three predicate offenses may vary greatly 
in degrees of seriousness which would cause them to not be 
equivalently blameworthy. 
 This argument lacks any basis in logic.  To the extent that 
the CCE statute allows conviction for the same offense based on 
any grouping of multiple related predicate acts, despite the fact 
that each act may carry very different penalties, this is a 
decision that has already been made by Congress.  In other words, 
Congress has already determined that regardless of the exact 
identity or seriousness of the predicate acts constituting the 
"continuing series," a defendant is equally blameworthy so long 
as he has engaged in multiple related drug-related offenses.  As 
the Supreme Court noted in Schad, "'the . . . legislature's 
definition of the elements of the offense is usually 
dispositive.'"  Schad, 501 U.S. at 639. 
 A legislature's definition of the elements of an crime does 
not offend constitutional strictures where such definition is 
supported by "history" and "shared practice."  See Schad, 501 
U.S. at 640.   As discussed earlier, Congress's decision not to 
require unanimity on the identities of the predicate acts for a 
CCE offense finds a historical analogue in the well established 
law that where an indictment alleges multiple acts charged in the 
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conjunctive, the jury need only be given a general unanimity jury 
instruction, and a general guilty verdict suffices to convict the 
defendant.  See, e.g., United States v. Linn, 31 F.3d 787, 991 
(10th Cir. 1994);  United States v. Peral-Cota, 1993 WL 68934, *4 
(9th Cir. 1993). 
 Moreover, a specific unanimity instruction to the jury would 
do nothing to change the fact that a defendant could be convicted 
for CCE regardless of whether the jury found that he engaged in a 
series of first-time simple possession offenses or whether the 
jury found that he engaged in a series of more serious crimes 
such as distributing large quantities of drugs.34 
 Accordingly, because Congress has already determined that 
any "continuing series of [drug] violations," regardless of the 
identity or seriousness of those drug violations, is equally 
blameworthy for purposes of CCE, we defer to Congress's 
determination as the Court deferred to the Arizona legislature's 
intent in Schad.  The majority's argument that the predicate acts 
making up such a "continuing series" may vary in degrees of 
seriousness is irrelevant, and Edmonds' conviction for CCE, even 
if based on less than unanimous jury agreement as to which three 
                     
34I raise this point not to "suggest[] that the equivalent 
blameworthiness test is a pointless exercise," (Maj. Op. at 22), 
but to highlight the fact that the majority's criticism of the 
CCE statute would not be cured by the specific unanimity 
instruction requested on the appeal before us.  Indeed, the 
majority's "equal blameworthiness" argument does not provide 
support for a specific unanimity instruction but instead stands 
as a challenge to the facial constitutionality of the CCE 
statute. 
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predicate acts constituted the "series," does not violate due 
process.35 
C. 
 Finally, the majority also argues that requiring specific 
unanimity is "counseled" by the rule of lenity.   
 First and foremost, the rule of lenity applies only when a 
statute is ambiguous and, in light of the traditional view that 
unanimity is required only as to the general verdict, the CCE 
statute cannot be deemed ambiguous. 
 Moreover, as the majority acknowledges, there is no 
authority for applying the rule of lenity to the issue posed in 
the present case.  Nevertheless, the majority argues that the 
rule of lenity should apply here because it has been applied to 
the "conceptually analogous situation:  whether a single criminal 
act constitutes one or more violations of a statute."  (Maj. Op. 
at 22).  I fail to see, however, how the issue of whether a 
single criminal act constitutes one or more violations of a 
statute is at all analogous to the present issue of whether the 
facts sought to be proven at trial are or are not so essential to 
proof of an element of the offense such that jury unanimity is or 
is not required. 
                     
35The majority also notes for the first time in the harmless error 
section of its opinion, that the Sixth Amendment is also 
"implicated" by the district court's failure to give a specific 
unanimity instruction in this case.  (Maj. Op. at 27).  However, 
as the majority concedes, the present inquiry turns not on Sixth 
Amendment concerns but Due Process concerns.  (Maj. Op. at 27 
n.11). 
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 The majority also invokes a number of cases for the 
proposition that the rule of lenity requires fair warning as to 
the harshness of criminal penalties for a given offense.  From 
there, the majority makes the tenuous connection that because 
procedural protections affect the likelihood that a penalty will 
be imposed, that "[a]t some point, differences in procedural 
protections become as significant as different penalties, and the 
need for fair warning just as critical."  (Maj. Op. at 24).36   
This argument is forced and fails to persuade.  The "procedural 
protections" at trial may affect the likelihood that a defendant 
will be convicted at trial (a jury question), but this is a 
separate issue from what penalties will be imposed (a statutory 
and/or judicial matter). 
 
III. 
 Because Congress has not required specific unanimity with 
respect to any of the predicate factual findings underlying the 
CCE statute, and because there is no basis for our requiring 
unanimity as to the identities of the predicate acts when we do 
not require unanimity as to the identities of the five supervised 
individuals, or as to the identities of the defendant's income 
and resources;  I would overrule Echeverri.  Instead I would hold 
that, absent Congressional intent requiring jury unanimity as to 
the identity of predicate factual findings, a specific unanimity 
instruction on a statute's predicate findings is not required. 
                     
36Presumably, the "procedural protection" that the majority has in 
mind is a specific unanimity instruction to the jury. 
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 Because there was no error committed by the district court, 
I would not reach the issue of harmless error.  Although I concur 
in the ultimate result reached by the majority in sustaining 
Edmonds' conviction, I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
holding that requires unanimity as to the identities of the 
predicate acts constituting the "continuing series" prong of the 
CCE statute.   
